

Military Intelligence

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**A NEW
VIEW**

Military Intelligence

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VANTAGE POINT

Major General Paul E. Menoher, Jr.

1990 was a year of extraordinary change in the international political-military arena, and in the MI Corps. In this issue of the bulletin, I want to summarize some of the significant changes impacting our Branch.

Changes have affected all aspects of Military Intelligence: readiness, training, materiel, doctrine, force structure, proponentcy, and base realignment. Most have been the result of our initiative; some were instigated by others or occurred as a direct consequence of the present political-economic climate.

The most significant event impacting our Branch in 1990 happened on 1 October, when we assumed command of Fort Huachuca and it became the official home of Military Intelligence. This was the direct result of the Base Realignment legislation passed by Congress in 1988, which also called for the Intelligence School, Fort Devens to move to Fort Huachuca to consolidate with the Intelligence Center and School. In December 1990 we were prepared to begin construction of the first \$90 million worth of a total \$128 million package of new facilities to accommodate the consolidation, when the Secretary of Defense declared a moratorium on all major construction until at least 15 April 1991. We still have the \$90 million and will proceed with the construction as soon as the moratorium is lifted. The new facilities and the consolidation of the two major training activities will be the realization of a dream come true.

In the area of readiness, three major changes were implemented in 1990, and an action plan to fix the endemic readiness problems in Reserve Component (RC) divisional MI battalions was approved. We reached agreement with Commander, CECOM to change Maintenance Allocation Charts to allow Intelligence Electronic Systems Repairers, MOS 33T, to perform up thru GS-level maintenance on IEW systems at the unit level. TRADOC and DA approved our initiative to establish key tactical IEW systems as pacing items and a new method of readiness reporting based on bands of performance. DA also approved our initiative to allow reporting of selected non-developmental items (NDI) of equipment as in lieu of (ILO) items for required IEW systems. HQDA, Chief Army Reserve, and Director National

Guard Bureau approved the MI community's plan to correct endemic RC MI personnel/MOS qualification and equipment on hand problems, but implementation of the specific items in the plan has languished. We will accelerate implementation of the action plan in 1991.

In the training arena we made major improvements in our officer courses to make them more tactically relevant based on lessons learned at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) and during Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD. We have four Project Warrior instructors (officers assigned as instructors after at least two years experience as an observer/controller at one of the CTCs) teaching and improving our officer courses. We also have regular exchanges with O/Cs from the National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training Center to ensure we capture current lessons learned in our instruction and doctrine. Our OBC is now as good or better than that of any branch in the Army in terms of tactical relevance and overall quality. Our OAC is also better and more tactically focused. The SIGINT portions in both the common core and 35G track course have made quantum leaps ahead thanks to direct input and support from NSA's National Cryptologic School.

We significantly altered our threat training for all officer, NCO and enlisted courses. We introduced read ahead material, added a major block on the Iraqi threat, and included a major hands-on exercise using miniature threat systems on terrain boards. We are also developing self paced, computer-assisted threat training.

We also improved our enlisted and NCO courses at all four training sites. We have restructured the 97E10 and 97B10 courses, including teaching 97B10s to the 97B20 competence level to qualify them as CI agents. We introduced new electronic SIGINT systems simulators and a new Morse trainer at Fort Devens. We incorporated the Air Force's Sentinel Bright Computer Assisted Instruction into our 98G Voice Interceptor training at Goodfellow Air Force Base, and we relocated 98K BNCOC instruction from Devens to Corry Station, Pensacola, Florida to take advantage of the subject matter expertise there.

We piggybacked on the Air Force's buy of the computerized General Imagery Intelligence

(Continued on page 45)

Command Sergeant Major David P. Klehn

This will be my last letter in MI Professional Bulletin as the Sergeant Major of the MI Corps. My wife, Carol, and I have decided to retire and we will depart the Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca at the beginning of February 1991. We have experienced and enjoyed a 30 year career in this great Army of ours. I was selected to be able to serve 35 years; however, we all have to make the decision sooner or later when we should leave. We decided the time was right to make our hobby, antiques, into a business in LaGrange, Ga.

In 30 years, I have served with great soldiers, noncommissioned officers, warrant officers, officers and civilians in the Army, our sister services and allied armies. I want to pass on some of my thoughts on my experiences.

I have been led and trained by great officers and noncommissioned officers. I thank them for their direction and guidance. I ask the officers to take care of their NCOs and soldiers. Get to know them and their families. Listen to their concerns. Guide them to reach their goals. Put them back on the path when they wander off. If they wander too far or they just can never stay on the path, help them to find a new path outside the Army. When you do have to put a soldier out, look at his or her performance and decide if they should be separated with the same benefits as the soldier who performed his or her duty well. I can't see a soldier who is kicked out of the service for acts of misconduct receiving the same benefits as a soldier who has been professional in his conduct and performance. It sends the wrong message.

Listen to your noncommissioned officers. In most cases they have been around a long time in the same types of jobs. They have tried a lot of officers' ideas and they may be able to save you time and effort. They know their soldiers and probably know what it takes to motivate them. Their advice on how to handle them may save a good soldier.

I ask you noncommissioned officers to live and breath the Creed of the Noncommissioned Officer. It contains the guidelines for every NCO to follow and practice. It covers three fundamental qualities: competence, responsibility and commitment. Every sergeant who wants to lead in this Army must understand and develop each of these qualities throughout a lifetime of service.

One of the responsibilities in the creed is the "welfare of my soldiers." I believe you have to be a good listener if you are going to take care of soldiers and their families. You have to hear their concerns and problems. You must put yourself in the soldier's position and guide the soldier to the correct solution. Then you must follow up to ensure the issue is resolved.

Unfortunately, I've seen NCOs who sat back and let their officers fail in their responsibilities. Instead, they should have worked with that officer and shared experiences. The outcome would have been better for the organization and the NCO should have felt pride in the success of the officer.

Fortunately for me, I am finishing my active duty at a TRADOC school where one can see firsthand the good qualities of the soldiers entering the Army today. It is exciting to watch their enthusiasm and eagerness. You have to love them when you see them excel, fail and recover with an incredible effort to win. I get charged up each day when I hear their cadences as they run physical training or march to and from class. I love their yells in morning formations as they try to sound louder than their rival companies. I will truly miss the soldiers. To each soldier, I owe a personal debt.

Major General Menoher has selected Command Sergeant Major James A. (Art) Johnson to replace me. I know the chief has made an excellent choice. I have had the pleasure of watching CSM Johnson leading the soldiers of the 111th MI Brigade here at Fort Huachuca for 18 months. I know everyone will give him the same support they gave me during my tenure.

As I end my active duty in the Army, I want to express my personal appreciation to my leaders for their confidence, direction and support; the soldiers and noncommissioned officers for their performance and trust; the Army for a great career; my wife for her love, support, hard work, confidence and being Command Sergeant Mother when I was away; and my God for my health and His protection.

Now, it is time for me to fade away.

FROM THE EDITOR

Happy New Year!

I hope you enjoyed our last issue. Some of you may have heard the rumor that it was indeed our *last* issue; however, we were saved from the budget axe and are back in business full swing. Due to the budget crisis this issue might arrive a couple of weeks late, as it put our production goals off schedule, and I apologize for that. But in this case I literally can say, "Better late than never."

We've received some really outstanding articles over the last couple of months, and I think you'll like the ones I've selected for this issue. Two of them concern recent changes in Soviet doctrine. Both are a bit complex, but as intelligence professionals we need to understand the critical information the two authors present. Unfortunately our Army Effective Writing Program hasn't spread to the Soviet Union yet, so anytime you deal with their doctrine you need to be prepared to wade through some things.

It's been said that the best way to defeat an enemy is to make him your friend. A very poignant article about an American family's contact with an East German one proves the truth of that statement. The kind acts of many American GIs 45 years ago may have been our most effective weapons in bringing down Eastern Europe's communist regimes. At least in one East German man's heart, years of anti-American indoctrination and propaganda were no match for the positive image of Americans a kind soldier instilled in him so many years ago.

In this issue, we also salute two great Americans — George Washington and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Most people are aware of their accomplishments as generals and presidents, but far fewer are aware that both were great believers in and users of intelligence.

With this issue, I would also like to salute another great person — Mrs. Irene B. Pease. As most of you know, she's been the associate editor listed on the inside of our cover for many years. But in fact, she's been the true heart of this publication. She retired at the end of November, and it's not enough to say that she will be missed. Her contributions to this magazine and the Intelligence Center and School are inestimable. Bea held this magazine together during many of its most difficult times. She was a life-saver and true friend to me, bringing me on board when I had a three month underlap with CPT Vance, and keeping things going smoothly when I was hospitalized and spent a month on convalescent leave. This is her last issue, and in her honor I've strived to make it the best one ever. Thanks for everything, Bea!

Sincerely,

Arda A. Hornum



LETTERS

Dear Editor:

More and more often we hear discussions on the future of the Soviet army — what kind of future this will be, how the army must change in order to be more responsive to its missions in a time of great political change in the world today. First of all, the Soviet army is reducing its size. However, at the same time it must preserve its defensive and combat capability. It is also very important in today's environment to ensure the advanced quality of technology that it must be equipped with.

Today, not only the quantity of armament but also the effectiveness and employment of a weapon play a very important role. There are many examples where numerical superiority was unable to determine the outcome of a conflict. A high level of combat capability and modern technology demands quality training of personnel and a truly professional approach.

I personally do not share the opinion of those who think that a transition of the Soviet armed forces to a profession is impossible or economically too expensive. Even today, a large number of personnel in the Soviet army are professionals — officers, warrant officers and those soldiers who stayed in beyond their initial conscription. Moreover, if one were to discuss the economic side, the end result, after the Soviet army becomes more effective and actually begins to economize its manpower and technical resources, will not be as

expensive as many people believe.

Today's problems demand that the Soviets look for new ways to renew the army, improve preparation of personnel, and to properly employ and train those personnel. Today's demographic indicators will not allow planners to wastefully employ a manpower resource that is needed by both the army and the country. It is necessary for Soviet planners to find the appropriate approach to attract quality people. This means that real economic incentives and compensation to the military must exist. There must be contractual agreements, increases in salary, incentives and pensions. The Soviet armed forces must constantly change to respond to the changing world situation and must adapt themselves to new social and military reforms. Transitional periods are quite complicated; however, one of the paths for the Soviet army is a transition into a professional basis that would more resemble the Western military.

Captain Michael J. Geskin
U.S. Air Force Academy
Colorado Springs, Colo.

Dear Editor:

Your October-December 1990 edition is a powerful, informative, stimulating and useful publication. Keep up the outstanding work.

I appreciate General Eichelberger's emphasis on S2s and company command and will endeavor to get our best officers posted to those critical battle-

field positions. I also appreciate the outstanding captains and majors being assigned to the Phantom Corps. Please keep them coming; we need more of them.

Major Gary Parrish's article "Reforger: Interoperability at its Best," was superb. He points out loud and clear the need for much more robust TOEs for tactical MI units. Parrish understands the realities of communications, logistics, jumping TOCs and interoperability. These all loom large as we have deployed Phantom Corps units to Saudi Arabia.

Captain Ken Robinson's and Lieutenant Colonel Don Kerrick's articles, if heeded by all MI leaders, would enhance our readiness many fold.

Captain Gonzalez great observations concerning NTC S2 performance point out that we are not getting captains in battalion S2 slots. My observation of those officers who have performed as S2s at NTC is that, regardless of rank, the majority of them are some of our best tactical MI leaders.

James Patterson's article points to our individual, unique and wonderful differences in perceiving the world. We must pay much more attention to this if we are to maximize the powerful potential of each MI soldier.

Lastly, I enjoyed Major Ray Levesque's book review. I disagree with him on one point. I take as serious advice that all officers should dance.

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

Colonel Joe Blair, III
Phantom G2



GEORGE WASHINGTON: AMERICA'S FIRST SPYMASTER

By Peter Kross

The American Revolution was the proving ground for American spy operations in years to come. General George Washington's use of deception, covert activities, secret inks and informers was a model for future generations of spymasters. His idea that with good intelligence a smaller force could defeat an enemy of much larger size was proven on the battlefield. It truly can be said that without the splendid espionage network established by Washington the tide of battle and the future shape of the United States might well have been different.

***"Washington was
America's first master spy
... he deceived the British
on numerous occasions."***

Legend has it that Washington never told a lie. The fact is that he told plenty of lies in furthering the American cause against Britain. Washington was America's first master spy. He deceived the British on numerous occasions and ran one of the largest espionage operations in American history. As leader of the American forces, Washington was responsible for the safety of the troops under his command. Badly outnumbered by the British, he used every means at his disposal to counteract the numerically superior British forces. He realized not only that American secret agents could gather vital information on the British but could give the enemy false information as well.¹

Elias Boudinot

Washington gave Colonel Elias Boudinot the job of deceiving the British into thinking that the colonists had more men than they actually had. Boudinot was a native of New Jersey and later served as a member of the Continental Congress.

"He realized not only that American secret agents could gather vital information on the British but could give the enemy false information as well."

Under Washington's instructions, Boudinot ordered his troops bivouacked in two's and three's at their winter quarters in Morristown, New Jersey. To anyone interested in the size of the colonial troops, the sight of men stretched out for miles would surely gain attention.

A British agent whose activities were well known to Washington was allowed free access to Morristown where he could readily see for himself the "large" number of colonial troops bivouacked in the area. The British decision not to attack Washington's encampment was a direct result of American deception.²

John Honeyman

During the battle of Trenton, Washington recruited a butcher named John Honeyman to get information on the British strength. Honeyman, who had come to America from Ireland, was a resident of Griggstown, New Jersey.

In December 1776, Washington personally sent Honeyman to Trenton to scout the British forces. Washington told Honeyman that American troops along the Delaware River would be on the alert for a suspected "British spy." After Honeyman had gotten all the information he could on British forces, he was to tell any American patrol that he came across to take him personally to Washington's headquarters. Sure enough, as he was returning to the American lines, he was captured by an American patrol and taken directly to Washington. He then told his boss everything he had learned in Trenton.

Honeyman's cover as a British spy was enhanced when he "escaped" from an American jail after his guards discovered a small fire nearby. Once back in Trenton, Honeyman told the British that the colonists were badly disorganized and were not ready for battle. The British believed his story and were taken completely by surprise when the Americans attacked Trenton on the day after Christmas.³

The Mersebau Spy Ring

During the war, most of the British troops were stationed in New York City and had command of the vital Hudson River. In order to keep tabs on their activities in New York, Washington organized the Mersebau spy ring, which operated in Staten Island and Manhattan. The man in overall command of the Mersebau spy ring was Colonel Elias Dayton of the 1st Essex New Jersey Militia. The members of the group included Joshua Mersebau, his son John and Joshua's brother, Paul. They traveled to and from New York City and returned to Washington's headquarters with the vital information they picked up.

For 18 months, John Mersebau stayed in New Brunswick, New Jersey and collected information on the occupying British troops. The younger Mersebau constantly traveled between New Jersey and Staten Island using a courier named John Parker to help him in his spying activities. On one of his trips, Parker was caught and died while in a British jail. With the death of Parker, Mersebau took on the job as courier until he attracted the unwanted attention of the British and returned once and for all to American territory.⁴

"One of Washington's worst intelligence failures concerned his friend of many years, Benedict Arnold."

The Culper Ring

The most effective spy group Washington organized was the Culper Ring led by Major Benjamin Tallmadge. Tallmadge recruited Abraham Woodhull of Long Island, Robert Townsend of New York City, James Rivington and Caleb Brewster. These men traveled between New York and Long Island on the pretext of doing business in New York. The men of the Culper Ring used Austin Rose as their secret courier to take their messages from Long Island to New York. In order to protect Rose if he happened to be stopped by a British patrol, they hid their messages by using invisible ink. This ink, also called "white" or "syn-

thetic" ink, was produced by Sir James Jay, a doctor who was the brother of John Jay, a prominent American patriot. When this ink was used on plain white paper, it would be invisible to anyone reading it. At Washington's suggestion, the members of the Culper Ring wrote innocent looking letters with their secret messages inserted in between the lines with the invisible ink.

As an extra precaution, Tallmadge created a code or cipher system that substituted names and places with numbers. For example, Tallmadge was 721, Woodhall 722, Townsend 723 and New York 727. Tallmadge had three code books made up and gave one to Washington.

"The Culper Ring proved to be the best kept secret in Washington's intelligence network."

Two episodes in particular proved the worth of the Culper Ring. In November 1779, they learned that the British had gotten hold of reams of paper identical to the type used to print American money. The British planned to print this currency and give it to their Tory sympathizers in Connecticut to pay their taxes. After the Culper Ring detected the operation it was quickly shut down.

The second major operation uncovered by the Culper Ring concerned the arrival of the French troops under the Comte de Rochambeau. Rochambeau's troops were to arrive in Newport, Rhode Island in force. The British commander in New York, Sir Henry Clinton, knew of Rochambeau's planned landing. Washington, in order to deceive the British, arranged for Clinton's spies to intercept a message saying that the Americans were going to attack Clinton in New York once the British troops left to intercept Rochambeau's forces in Newport. Believing this false information to be true, Clinton kept his forces in New York and the huge French force landed unopposed.

The Culper Ring proved to be the best kept secret in Washington's intelligence network.^{5,6,7}

Benedict Arnold

One of Washington's worst intelligence failures concerned his friend of many years, Benedict Arnold. Arnold, a Brigadier General in the Amer-

ican Army, became a British agent. It was the Culper Ring that first discovered that he was working for the British when British Major John Andre paid a visit to the home of Robert Townsend's father in Oyster Bay, Long Island.

Townsend's sister Sarah saw a stranger leave a note addressed to "John Anderson" and later heard Andre talking to other British officers who were also in the house about the fortifications of West Point and how easy it would be to capture the fort. Sarah told her brother about the mysterious man in their father's home. Townsend quickly sent a message to Tallmadge who found out that Andre-Anderson had been picked up with information about West Point stashed in his boot. Tallmadge remembered that Arnold had issued orders that Andre be allowed through the American lines. Townsend immediately sent word of Arnold's treason to Washington's headquarters.

Unfortunately, before Arnold could be captured he fled to a waiting British warship and returned to British-occupied New York where he worked openly for the British. Washington planned an operation to capture Arnold and bring him back for trial, but before the plan could succeed, Arnold and his unit were sent to the Chesapeake Bay area.

Endnotes:

1. G.J.A. O'Toole, *The Encyclopedia of American Intelligence and Espionage* (N.Y.: Facts of File, 1988), pp. 487-489.
2. Nathan Miller, *Spying for America. The Hidden History of U.S. Intelligence* (N.Y.: Paragon House, 1989), p. 21.
3. Ibid, pp. 3-5.
4. O'Toole, p. 296.
5. Ibid, pp. 149-150.
6. *American History Illustrated*, November-December 1989, Volume XXIV, Number 6, pp. 26-27, 69.
7. Miller, pp. 22-33

Peter Kross is the author of New Jersey History, published by Middle Atlantic Press. He has published intelligence related articles in the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin and the American Intelligence Journal. Kross is a graduate of the Univ. of Albuquerque.



SOVIET DOCTRINE: A Blueprint for the Future or an Indictment of the Past

By Major William A. Ross

In 1938, Winston Churchill refused to predict Soviet behavior, calling the Soviet Union a "riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." Soviet behavior today is no less puzzling. *Glasnost* and *perestroika* focus our attention on the reforms apparently underway in many areas of Soviet life. The armed forces themselves are in the midst of profound changes, and these real, asserted and potential changes have fueled and shaped Western debate over the direction of Soviet military development. To understand and evaluate these events, to sort out the real from the apparent, knowledge of past and possible future Soviet military doctrine is essential.

Understanding Soviet doctrine, strategy and tactics is not an easy task. In this article I will trace Soviet doctrine development, from its roots in Prussian military thought to its current status as influenced by *glasnost* and *perestroika*. Until about 1987/1988 Soviet doctrine development progressed predictably. Changes to doctrine usually reflected technological development or the change of political leadership. It is not surprising that Soviet military doctrine had a political weight levied on it since the Soviets based much of their political/military thought on Clausewitz' principle that war is the violent extension of politics by other means.

Recently, however, a radical shift in the politics of the Soviet Union has initiated a landslide change in Soviet military doctrine. This change is a reversal from a system defined by a former Soviet Minister of Defense and Politburo member, Marshal of the Soviet Union, A.A. Grechko, who said "the fundamental importance of the military concept of Soviet military doctrine consists in ensuring the complete defeat of any aggres-

sor..." Under Gorbachev, this offensive doctrine is radically shifting to a defensive one. This shift will force a complete change in the operational mindset of Soviet military leaders and planners.

The transition to the defensive will have a lasting impact on Soviet military thought and training. Over the last 60 years entire curriculums at Soviet military universities have been structured to reflect the offensive nature of Soviet military doctrine. This training's foundation was in the scientific principles that norms can be developed through thought, study and observation. As in the application of norms to the development and control of Soviet society, the Soviet political leaders felt these norms could be applied to military thought and execution. They developed these norms into political and military theories. One thing that we must remember is that the Soviets think very differently than we in the political and military environments. We may have a totally different meaning than they do for the same words. Overall, it is important to understand these concepts about the Soviets and any other possible opponent. It is only through understanding the principles that motivate our potential adversaries that we can make analytical judgments on their short term and long term political direction and military objectives. If it comes to violent extension of policy, we can use this understanding to advise our chain of command on how we believe the adversary will apply his military capability on the battlefield in the form of military tactics.

Military Terms

When looking at the definitions of doctrine, strategy and tactics in the dictionary of military terms the definitions seem pretty straight forward.

Doctrine: Fundamental principles and operational concepts by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in military operations in support of national objectives.

Strategy: In war or peace, the planning and management of a nation's total available resources — economic, social, political and military — in order to achieve the goals of national policy and in wartime, to maximize the likelihood of victory. Such planning and management are the responsibilities of the highest levels of national and military authority. In a strict or military sense, strategy is the art and science of planning and directing military movements and operations so as to achieve victory.

Tactics: The technique of deploying and directing military forces — troops, ships or aircraft, or combinations of these, and their immediate supporting elements — in coordinated combat activities against the enemy in order to attain the objectives designated by strategy. As defined by Clausewitz, the use of an armed force in battle. As defined by Jomini, the maneuvers of an army on the day of engagement; its contents, its concentration, and the diverse formations used to lead the troops to the attack.

Soviet Embellishment

The Soviets embellish these terms and make them more profuse. John J. Dziak's book, **Soviet Perceptions of Military Doctrine: The Interaction of Theory and Practice**, extracted this definition of Soviet terms from the Soviet military dictionary. "Military doctrine (*voyennaya doktrina*) is a nation's officially accepted system of scientifically founded views on the nature of modern wars and the use of armed forces in them, and also on the requirements arising from these views regarding the country and its armed forces being made ready for war."

Military doctrine has two aspects: political and military technology. The basic tenets of a military doctrine are determined by a nation's political and military leadership according to the sociopolitical order; the country's level of economic, scientific and technological development; and the armed forces' combat material, with due regard to the conclusions of military science and views of the probable enemy.

Military strategy (*voyennaya strategiya*), the major element of military art, is defined as "the part of the military art that studies the foundations of the preparations and conduct of war and its campaigns as a whole. In practice it is policy's

weapon. With respect to strategy, policy plays the leading and directing role." Further, strategy is "general and common for all the services of the armed forces of the country."

Military tactics (*voyennaya taktika*) "the part of military art directly studying the basis for the preparation and combat actions of small units, and large units of all combat arms and services of the armed forces."

The Soviet definitions sound somewhat like ours; however, there are major differences in what they actually mean.

In 1978, a Rand Corporation study proposed "Soviet military doctrine, in marked contrast to prevailing U.S. strategic orthodoxy, is highly systematic in formulation, unambiguously martial in tone, and explicitly geared to a belief that should deterrence fail, some recognizable form of victory is theoretically attainable through the skillful exploitation of initiative, surprise and shock. Coupled with the dramatic Soviet force expansion and modernization effort that has been steadily under way since the mid-1960's, this robust Soviet image of nuclear war and the seemingly confident belief in the military utility of strategic weaponry that informs and permeates it warrant legitimate Western concern about Soviet intentions and serious attention to what the Soviets have to say about deterrence and war."

Rand draws a very imposing picture of what Soviet military doctrine was formulated to achieve. Basically, Soviet military doctrine is the officially accepted set of concepts that delineates the ways and means to achieve military objectives in the interest of politics. This doctrine also specifies the structure of the Soviet armed forces, allocates industrial resources and output, and orients research and development efforts to support armed forces. Military doctrine is the blueprint drawn up by the highest Soviet political leaders that describes in specific detail the shape of the armed forces and the way they are to be used.

Formulation of Doctrine

The formulation of Soviet military doctrine is a continuous evolutionary process based on:

Communist ideology.

Foreign policy.

Economic and military strengths of adversaries.

Soviet resources and geography.

History.

Science and technology.

Military doctrine is based on an elaborate, integrated system of thought. The doctrinal concepts are precisely defined, and each has its place in a hierarchy of importance that corresponds to its military decision-making level. The system deals with all military issues, ranging from national defense policy down to platoon tactics. Soviet officers are quite familiar with the entire system of thought and routinely think, express themselves and formulate decisions using these concepts.

Military Science and Military Art

Soviet military doctrine development and implementation are a result of military science and military art. Military science is the study and analysis of the diverse psychological and material phenomena relevant to armed combat for developing practical recommendations for the achievement of victory in war. It encompasses virtually all things military. Unlike doctrine, military science is characterized by controversy and debate. In military science, there may be several points of view, diverse "scientific" concepts and original hypotheses that are not selected as doctrine and therefore are not accepted as official state views on military issues.

Relating the terminology of Soviet military science to comparable U.S. concepts is somewhat easier than relating the terminology of military doctrine. What is referred to as doctrine in American military lexicons usually equates to operational art and tactics in the Soviet military idiom. Soviet military strategy lacks an exact U.S. equivalent, however, because of its high political content. A U.S. counterpart of Soviet military science would include a group of terms ranging from military science, to logistics, to tactics, and even to doctrine.

For good or ill, there apparently is no ordered semantic and political hierarchy of U.S. military thought along the lines of the Soviet model. This asymmetry may very well contribute to Western tendencies to take the highly charged Soviet military concept less than seriously.

Westerners who are not familiar with the hierarchical nature of Soviet military thought frequently confuse military science and strategy with party theses of military doctrine. This is due especially to the relatively free-flowing nature of the debates on military science which suffuse many Soviet military journals and, to a lesser extent, books. It should be recognized that the strategic leadership, comprising senior party and

military officials, encourages this ferment so as to draw out the best thinking for input to doctrine. However, when a doctrinal decision is reached on a given issue (e.g., the decision to opt for a balanced defense emphasizing war-fighting and damage-limitation rather than minimum deterrence) that issue is no longer fair game for debate.

Military art is the theory and practice of conducting armed conflict. It is the most important and primary field within military science and is the basis for strategy, operational art and tactics. The principles of military art are the basic ideas and the most important recommendations for the organization and conduct of battles, operations and warfare.

The concepts of military art and its role in military science are not just empty exercises in the Marxist-Leninist theory. Many Soviet officers hold advanced degrees in military science and are serious and intense in their studies. They are convinced of the superiority of this methodology for preparing the Soviet armed forces to achieve success in modern warfare. The structure of ideas, terminology and concepts associated with this system of thought constitutes the very vocabulary through which Soviet officers express their perceptions of military problems and the measures they develop to resolve them.

Military art applies to three separate but interdependent levels of combat activity:

Strategic - national and theater level.

Operational - fronts and armies.

Tactical - division and below.

Soviet perspective on and prescriptions for armed conflict require that tactical success leads to operational success. Similarly, operational gains lead to strategic success.

It is often difficult to separate Soviet tactics from what the Soviets call "operational art" because the maneuver divisions that are the subject of tactics are the maneuver elements that achieve the "operational" objectives of armies and fronts. Moreover, the two concepts are closely interrelated in Soviet military thinking and planning. A recurring theme in Soviet military writing is the need for the commander to keep the "operational" goal in mind.

The overriding objective of the combined arms offensive is to rapidly turn tactical success into operational success by a well-orchestrated combination of massive fire, maneuver and deep violent strikes.

We need to understand what the Soviets mean

by "tactics" and "operations" as well as the various words and verbal formulas that they associated with each concept. To the Soviet officer, the word "operation" informs him that the activity in question involves at least an army or a front that was probably tailored for the mission. "Tactics" consist of combat actions at division level and lower. Divisions have a set organizational structure that, except for combat support reinforcement, does not vary from mission to mission.

Divisions fight battles, whereas armies conduct operations. First-echelon divisions usually pursue tactical objectives in the enemy's tactical depth, whereas armies — normally using their second-echelon divisions — must achieve operational objectives in the enemy's operational depth.

Soviet military theorists consider the following points to be the general principles of military art:

Be fully prepared to accomplish the mission regardless of the conditions under which war begins or must be conducted.

Achieve surprise whenever possible. Military operations must be characterized by decisiveness and aggressiveness. Forces must strive continuously to seize and to hold the initiative.

Make full use of all available military assets and capabilities to achieve victory.

Ensure that major formations and units of all services, branches and arms effect thorough and continuous coordination.

Select the principal enemy objective to be seized and the best routes for attacking it. Make a decisive concentration of combat power at the correct time.

Maintain continuous and reliable command and control.

Be determined and decisive in achieving the assigned mission.

These do not represent any special revelation of truth or radical departure from traditional military thought. However, by their emphasis on these particular points, Soviet military leaders reveal the character of their military thinking. By studying this thinking we should be able to predict the basic characteristics of future Soviet military operations.

Soviet Laws of War

Marshal Sokolovskiy wrote that Soviet military thought subscribes to certain "laws of war" at the strategic level and "principles of operational art and tactics" which apply to the actual conduct of combat. These laws can be simplified

as:

Be prepared. Prepare in peacetime for the next war. Forces-in-being are the decisive factors. The side with the most and best troops and equipment at the start of war will win the war.

The side which can best sustain a protracted war will win the war.

The higher the political stakes of a war, the longer and more violent it will be.

War aims must be seen as just. Modern war cannot be waged without the public support.

Soviet planning and preparation for war reflect a dominant feeling that war is inevitable. This is not to say that the Soviets want war, but that they are preparing for it continuously.

Soviet Military Principles

As the laws of war dominate strategic planning for war, so do principles of operational art and tactics govern the conduct of warfare within a given theater of operations. The popular Western version of these Soviet operational and tactical principles is very brief: objective, offensive surprise, maneuver and mass. However, this list does not fairly characterize the basis on which Soviet military leaders plan and conduct operations and tactics. Just as they add new equipment to their forces without abandoning older equipment, the Soviets have modernized operational and tactical principles without fully abandoning earlier ones. Contemporary Soviet military theorists hold that nuclear weaponry and other means of modern warfare have modified the classic Russian military principles that were taught by the tsarist general staff. The most significant of these military principles are:

He who gets to the initial battle with the "most" wins.

The enemy must be confronted with more than one situation to deal with.

One should not be diverted by geographical objectives but should concentrate on the destruction of the enemy's military forces.

Detailed, exacting preparation must precede an attack.

Design actions to preempt the opponent and keep him reacting to situations that you control.

Concentrate on the enemy's weak points rather than his strengths.

By the early 1970's, the following dominated Soviet operational art and tactics:

Mobility and high rates of combat operations.

Concentration of efforts and creation of superiority in forces and means over the enemy at the decisive place and at the decisive time.

Surprise and security.

Combat activeness.

Preservation of the combat effectiveness of friendly forces.

Conformity of the goal to the actual situation.

Coordination.

Commenting on the above listing, Colonel V. Ye. Savkin wrote the following:

"The enumerated principles have become the most important although of course, they cannot encompass the entire diversity of combat activity. Even now, as there is further development of means of warfare and military art, other principles can be formulated. For example, the principles of simultaneous action upon the enemy to the entire depth of his deployment and upon objectives of the deep rear have acquired an increasingly realistic basis with the adoption of nuclear weapons."

Postwar Development

Soviet doctrine is a dynamic animal that has encompassed a number of stages in postwar development:

- The period 1945-1953, which ended with the death of Stalin and was marked by a period of significant technological progress.

- 1953-1959, with the introduction of the nuclear weapon and the missile which brought about radical changes in all aspects of warfare, forcing major revisions in basic concepts.

- 1960-1987, a period highlighted by the preparation of the Soviet armed forces, the country and all the people first of all and primarily to struggle with the aggressors in conditions of nuclear war.

During this last period, the famed Soviet "revolution in military affairs" occurred. The outlook of the Soviet officers corps required a complete reorientation. At this time, most of the officers were products of World War II. A number of Soviet leaders of the early 1960's had actually fought in the civil war. During this period, the Soviet belief that nuclear war was "fightable and winnable" developed. This was particularly disturbing to U.S. policy makers.

- In 1967, taking into account NATO's announced military strategy of flexible response, the Soviets began to plan for a non-nuclear phase in the event of a conflict between the Warsaw

Pact and NATO.

- In 1974, Marshal Grechko declared the mission of the Soviet armed forces was no longer restricted to defending "our Motherland and other socialist countries." This appeared to mean the Soviets intended to project military power and presence into any place in the world where Soviet interests might be perceived. This was another policy which U.S. planners reacted to in evaluating our force structure and national policy.

If doctrine is the Party's guide to the strategic structure and future of the military, then it is the military strategy that would implement the doctrine. Military strategy, as carefully explained by Soviet spokesmen, occupies a subordinate position in relation to doctrine. Strategy, as a scientific theory, develops the basic methods and forms of armed conflict on a strategic scale and, at the same time, carries out the military leadership of the war. Theoretical positions of strategy influence military doctrine and its scientific development. At the same time, strategy directly executes doctrine and is its instrument in working out plans for war and preparation of the country for it. During times of war, military doctrine recedes somewhat into the background, since armed combat is guided primarily by military-political and military-strategic ideas, conclusions, and generalizations, which flow from actual conditions. Consequently, war and armed conflict are directed not by doctrine, but by strategy.

In Soviet thought, strategy does not stand alone. It is grouped under military art along with operational art and tactics. All are interrelated and interdependent. Among these, strategy plays the leading role since it is a direct instrument of politics, a reflection of the Party's political strategy. Soviet sources generally concede that the dividing line between military doctrine and military strategy can be vague at times, especially since political considerations predominate in both. However, since the professional military are charged with the overall fleshing out of military science, they clearly have the operational task of devising military strategy subject to Party guidance. As far as they are concerned, "the political objective of war determines the major intermediate tasks of military operations," and "it is the job of strategy to achieve" such tasks. A past Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Ogarkov, makes clear that the proper fulfillment of these tasks by military strategy creates for the Soviet armed forces the "objective capabilities of achieving victory."

Simply put, it is the duty of military strategy to devise the means for winning wars.

The operational orientation of military strategy is characterized by the following commentary of Sokolovskiy and General Major Cherednichenko:

"Military strategy as a science may be stated as: determination of the nature, character, and condition of the outbreak of various types of wars; the theory of organization of the armed forces, of their structure, and development of a system of military equipment and armament; the theory of strategic planning; the theory of strategic deployment, establishment of strategic deployment, establishment of strategic grouping, and the maintenance of combat readiness of the armed forces; the theory of preparation of the economy and the country as a whole for war in all respects, including preparation of the population in a moral sense; the creation of reserve supplies of arms, combat equipment, and other material resources; the development of methods of conducting armed struggle, of types and forms of strategic operations; determination of forms and methods of strategic leadership of the armed forces, the development of command systems; the study and evaluation of a probable enemy; the theory of strategic intelligence; and the theory of possible results of a war."

In an applied sense, military strategy is in the bailiwick of the high command and general staff and associated military staff and educational institutions. In short, it concerns itself with strategic defense, strategic offense, command and control, and associated logistics from the general staff level of the strategic leadership, i.e., theaters of war and theaters of military operations.

Operational art has a similar focus but at lower levels of command concern, it is oriented toward sub-theater questions at the front and army level and local operations by the service arms and is the connecting link between strategy and tactics.

Finally, tactics fixes on the problems of conducting and controlling military operations from division level and below for all branches and services of the Soviet armed forces.

Conclusions

We have taken a long look at Soviet doctrine, strategy and tactics. Essentially, it is likely that the Soviet mind-set on what strategy and tactics will do will not change. Strategy and tactics will still serve as instruments of Soviet doctrine. In

1987-1988, a major modification in Soviet doctrine occurred. Although not officially designated a revolution in military affairs by the Soviets, the change in doctrine carries almost the same impact as the 1960's revolution in military affairs. Like the 1960's event, the change from an offensive to defensive doctrine as outlined by Gorbachev in his December 1988 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, will involve a complete re-education process within the Soviet military. Their past doctrine fostered within the military a pre-emptive, attack first mindset. This mindset molded the military's training, operations and procurement objectives for decades. Soviet military leaders will have to be retaught to think in defensive terms and to train using defensive scenarios.

Others within the Soviet government will have to change the way they think as well. Gorbachev's speech tacitly admitted that the decades-old propaganda goal of convincing the world that the U.S.S.R was a peace loving country intent mostly on defending the Motherland had been deceptive. By announcing the switch to a defensive doctrine, Gorbachev acknowledged the fact that the Soviets' previous posture, in fact, had been an offensive one.

Gorbachev's removal of so many old establishment military leaders probably reflected a lesson learned from the first revolution in military affairs. The main difference in this "revolution" is that it is being driven by political change and not the technological change that occurred in the 1960's. In his speech, Gorbachev outlined an ambitious schedule to transition the doctrine within two years. However, Vladimir Nasarenko, a Soviet colonel and Professor of Military Science, wrote that this transition would take 12 years.

Interestingly, transition to a defensive doctrine will require the transformation of the entire Soviet military policy. All training and service manuals have to be changed radically. The first drafts of the internal service manual were presented in July by the Army periodical *Kransnaya Zvezda*. All others have yet to follow.

To date, Soviet strategic and operational doctrines have called for a preventive strike in order to destroy "the aggressor on his own territory." The theaters of operations have been defined accordingly and Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops deployed appropriately. Arms programs, weapons and equipment acquisition, as well as the raising and complementing of the armed forces have

been tailored to this strategy.

In this concept, it must be remembered that it took 10 years for NATO to change its strategy from total retaliation, the first principle of Western defense, to flexible response.

Western defense ministers confirm unanimously that Soviet procurement programs continue to modernize the armed forces with offensive weapons. That should not be surprising. Planning, development and production of new weapons takes 10 to 20 years. Changing a procurement program in midstream could entail the loss of billions of rubles. Therefore, such drastic cuts cannot be expected for all programs; only, at best, for those which have just been started.

The principle of the new Soviet military doctrine according to Gorbachev is now "reasonable sufficiency"; i.e., what is absolutely necessary for securing the defense of the country. Obviously, in this, Gorbachev considers a balance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. According to this principle, the reduction of Soviet troops and arms can only take place with a reciprocal movement on NATO's side. Therefore, the transformation of Soviet military doctrine becomes dependent on results in terms of arms reduction, troop reductions and arms control.

Nasarenko analyzed the implications of the negotiations on conventional force reductions with regard to the timetable of transition to a defensive military doctrine. His conclusion was that if all Soviet proposals for the reduction of conventional arms and forces from the Atlantic to the Urals are accepted by the West, and "on the condition that throughout all phases of the negotiations the general balance of forces is being maintained and nobody's security is impaired" the whole process would be possible in three stages and could be completed by the year 2000. Only then would it be possible to talk about the transition of the military doctrine to a decidedly defensive character.

The Soviet proposals are based on the assumption that during the first phase (1991-1994) the differences and asymmetries in terms of force levels and major arms between the Warsaw Pact and NATO would be eradicated. During this phase the potential for executing a surprise attack and launching major offensive operations would be reduced. This primarily affects tactical combat aircraft, combat helicopters, main battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery including multiple rocket launchers and grenade launchers.

During the second phase (1994-1997) the forces in East and West which have been balanced in the meantime will be reduced by around 25 percent. Additional weapon systems have to be reduced against the background of these cuts to realize the principle of sufficiency.

The final phase (1997-2000) would see the reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces to a defensive character.

The comparison between the Western and Soviet proposals suggests that there are many difficulties and differences to be overcome prior to an agreement. This could well lengthen even the timescale estimated by Nasarenko.

Since 1945, Soviet military doctrine was the avalanche pushing the force levels that Soviet leaders thought were needed to defend the "Motherland." Reliance on past military theorists and concepts like "mass of force" drove the Soviet military industrial complex to manufacture outstanding military equipment. Sleek, modern military equipment overlaid the shoddy and scant consumer goods, poor housing and a society that had not progressed much past the 1917 Revolution. Today, the Soviet Union is nearly bankrupt and verging on political, social and economic collapse. Gorbachev's doctrine, in its defensive orientation, is a pragmatic blue print for the future. The doctrine change, like his many other innovations, has had a revolutionary impact and starkly contrasts with the past. Ultimately, we do not know how long it will take to switch to a solely defensive doctrine. In the two years since Gorbachev's speech, we have seen drastic unexpected changes such as the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the unification of the two Germanys. We are now seeing a restructuring of Soviet forces especially in the air defense and tank units indicating a defensive posture. These changes now have momentum. Also, the rapid changes have caused U.S. defense planners and defense budgeteers to leapfrog with the changing nature of the threat. However, rather than gear our defense budget and intelligence analysis to a five year outlook, it would be wise to anticipate when and what could be the next change in Soviet doctrine and what world impact might that bring 20 years from now.

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PERESTROIKA and the SOVIET MILITARY

By Captain Erich V. Boerner

The military facet of *perestroika* is critical to Mikhail Gorbachev's attempt to restructure the entire Soviet way of life. Perestroika's impact on the U.S.S.R.'s military forces, however, has been an issue of continuing debate among Soviet and U.S. national security experts. The major question revolves around whether or not the theoretical and political consensus reached by key civilian and military leaders concerning military restructuring has resulted in any tangible indication of this "new thinking."

While Soviet military leaders have embraced the political aspects of "reasonable sufficiency" (armed forces capable of performing only defensive tasks, with no capacity to carry out large offensive operations) and accepted a subordinate role in society for the armed forces, there have been no concrete results associated with this shift in thinking. Nor have there been any changes in their operational concepts of the conduct of war.¹ Consequently, the United States must move cautiously in military reform, budgeting, research and development, and acquisition.

The Concept of Military Perestroika

Military *perestroika* received its impetus from the concept of "new thinking." As applied to the military, it encompasses several key arguments: mutual security (as opposed to the total security espoused by Stalin), the inability to "win" a nuclear war, the priority of politics over military might, and a shift in military thinking from victory to prevention of defeat. Furthermore, military *perestroika* implicitly calls for increased civilian control over the armed forces.²

Understanding that economics is the driving social force is integral to understanding *perestroika*. The Soviets must trim their military machine out of necessity. While support for "new thinking" in the armed forces was limited in its early stages, its viability was enhanced in 1988 when Foreign Minister Shevardnaze proclaimed that capitalism was not inherently militaristic. This allowed the Soviets to formally redefine the

threat from the West and begin implementing structural changes. The two elements of common security (a strong defense and cooperative measures such as intrusive inspections) were viewed as methods that would help reduce the mutual threat of attack.

The Subjugation of the Military

The fundamental downgrading of the Soviet military began in 1986 as the domestic media began to conduct unrestrained assaults on the military and its effectiveness. In early 1987, previously taboo subjects, such as the military budget, began to be openly debated in the media. Conscript hazing was detailed publicly and caused acute embarrassment among senior Soviet military leaders. In 1988, Shevardnaze directly undercut the primacy of the military by stating that diplomacy was cheaper and more effective than military strength. Perhaps the crowning touch to the military's downgrading came during Gorbachev's December 1988 speech to the United Nations when he announced significant unilateral troop reductions. That caused the symbolic resignation of Marshal Akhromeyev, widely viewed as a sound defeat for the military.³

Concurrently, high-level general officers began to be replaced by Gorbachev supporters. The most notable replacements occurred as a result of the May 1987 Matthias Rust incident. Gorbachev used that event to retire Defense Minister Sokolov and General Koldunov, Commander of the Air Defense Forces.

In May of 1987, after reasonable sufficiency was adopted as a doctrine, Gorbachev made it clear to his marshals that he expected them to do more with less. He personally became the major force behind arms control agreements and presided over the development of reasonable sufficiency as the Soviets' primary military doctrine.

Gorbachev has continued his pressure on the military to change. As late as mid-1989, he openly criticized the performance of the army and cited discipline in nuclear weapons units as a specific source of concern. At the same time, he admitted that *perestroika* continued to face

strong resistance in the armed forces.⁴

What are the Facts?

The perception of a reduced Soviet threat is misleading. Regardless of whether already promised reductions come about, the Soviets will remain one of the most powerful militaries in the world. Despite Gorbachev's plan to reduce the defense budget by nearly 15 percent over the next two years, Soviet defense expenditures have increased by an average of three percent annually since 1985.⁵ Modernization is occurring in nearly every category of military equipment with the SS-18, Mod 5, heavy ICBM offering a perfect example.⁶ Moreover, the United States must understand that reversing the Soviet war machine into a defense-oriented military will require at least five to ten years⁷, as the Soviet Union is still working with a five-year economic plan authored under Brezhnev. Gorbachev's mark will have to be made and evaluated during the next five-year plan, starting in 1991.

Perhaps, most importantly, military restructuring is not an issue that can be resolved in a vacuum — it is part of the nationalities issue, the international situation, and a multitude of other variables. The military's interpretation of reasonable sufficiency (termed defensive sufficiency by Akhromeyev, it calls for a defensive phase followed by a counteroffensive) is not a doctrinal change but more an adaptation onto an operational war plan.⁸ *Perestroika* has also allowed Soviet client-states to voice their opinion regarding the military structures within their countries. The overriding desire has been to begin ridding themselves of the Soviet military presence. As the Soviet ability to conduct reprisals has grown weaker, their ability to contest these desires has also weakened.

It is equally important to realize that publicly stated intentions, by themselves, are not an adequate indicator of Soviet plans. According to Chief of the General Staff, General Moiseyev, the percent of the defense complex dedicated to producing civilian goods will rise from 40 to 60 percent by 1995, and defense spending will be cut in half by 1995.⁹ These are not facts, nor do they represent capabilities. At best, they are goals that cannot be accepted as reality until verified.

Perestroika has lowered the primacy of the military as a foreign policy tool. The withdrawal from Afghanistan, the pressuring of Vietnam to leave Kampuchea, and the government's positive attitude concerning an Angolan settlement all

indicate that diplomacy has risen to the forefront over military power projection and influence.¹⁰

Long-Range Possibilities

The effect of *perestroika* on the military is potentially significant. Several proposals already being considered include establishing a smaller, professional army, disbanding the army in favor of a national militia, and creating separate territorial armies for each of the 15 Soviet Republics.¹¹ There is also a proposal to create a legislative oversight process within the Supreme Soviet, much like that found in the U.S. government. While top military leaders vehemently oppose such changes, the decisions may be mandated by the economic progress (or lack thereof) of *perestroika*. There are already indications that the Soviets are transitioning from armor-heavy armies to more streamlined, mobile, self-sufficient units.¹²

The battle between the military and private sector over resource allocation is not settled. Military officials are pointing out that high-tech, "smart" weapons of a conventional nature and high-yield chemical warheads (not nuclear weapons) will decide future conflicts. In their minds, that will require increased military funding.¹³ Gorbachev must also concern himself with the attitudes of the senior military leaders. If men such as Yazov, Moiseyev and Akhromeyev complain too vehemently, Gorbachev could soon find himself in the same position Khrushchev did in 1964 — out of power.¹⁴

Conclusion

The consequences of military *perestroika*, to this point, depend on individual analysis. Some view the program as a repeat of the fraudulent *detente* used by Brezhnev in the early 1970's, while others see it as the beginning of the end of the Soviet military machine.¹⁵ The correct interpretation is more likely a compromise between the two. Clearly, the success of *perestroika* depends on the battle over resource allocation between the civilian and military sectors. The "view of the battlefield" and the strategic/conventional mix that results are also factors.

While it is clear that the military will have to do with less, the intent of military *perestroika* is not to dismantle the Soviet war machine, but to increase its efficiency. While senior leaders have accepted the subjugation of the armed forces (at least temporarily), they hope that a revitalization of the Soviet economy will mean increased mod-

ernization and weapons upgrades in the future to improve their qualitative and quantitative standing vis-a-vis the United States and NATO.

Gorbachev's fundamental view of national security seems diametrically opposed to that of previous Soviet leaders, yet he invites divergent opinions regarding threat assessment. The litmus test of his sincerity will not rest with word, doctrine or debate, but with actual, verifiable physical restructuring to a defensive military force. The intelligence community must remember that Soviet intentions have not necessarily equated to Soviet capabilities.

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
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by Captain Michael E. Bigelow

On October 14, 1990, we celebrated the centennial of Dwight D. Eisenhower's birth. In commemoration of the event, a host of articles and books appeared on his generalship, leadership and presidency. Few, if any, of these, however, focused on Eisenhower as a user of intelligence. Yet as commander of Allied forces, he appreciated and used intelligence throughout his campaigns in Europe during World War II.

A study of Eisenhower as an intelligence consumer and director can be instructive to the modern officer. As a consumer, his experience shows the limitations of the intelligence community, even when correct, to affect decision makers. Nevertheless, the intelligence officer must present his commander with the capabilities of the enemy, not just his most probable courses of action. Without knowing the full capabilities of the enemy, the commander can't make provisions to meet whatever the enemy does.

As a director, Eisenhower shows that a commander can't rely on one source of intelligence, no matter how good. It must be amplified and confirmed with other, perhaps more mun-

dane, sources. Also, a study of Eisenhower shows the importance of a good relationship between the commander and the G2.

Inexperience with Intelligence

Remarkably, Eisenhower had little experience with intelligence before World War II. Graduating from West Point in 1915, he spent World War I in stateside training assignments. Over the next two decades, he held a variety of staff positions. But he never filled an intelligence position, or one that required him to grapple with the problems of gathering and using information on the enemy.

Eisenhower's military schooling didn't compensate for his lack of practical experience. The inter-war Army schools emphasized operations, not intelligence. While they gave some instruction in tactical reconnaissance, they overlooked the broader fields of collecting and using intelligence. So he received no formal training in how a commander should control intelligence operations. In short, his pre-war training and experience did little to prepare him for his future duties in regard to intelligence.

The lack of pre-war preparation forced Eisen-

hower to learn from his own personal experience. Fortunately, he was a quick learner. His first lessons came almost as soon as America entered the war.

Early Lessons

In December 1941, General George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, brought Eisenhower to Washington as his chief planner. Under Marshall's guidance, Eisenhower mapped out America's basic strategy. Soon he discovered that scanty intelligence was "a shocking deficiency that impeded all constructive planning."¹

His next lesson broadened Eisenhower's view of intelligence sources. It came after his appointment as the commander of American troops in England in June 1942. Winston Churchill introduced Eisenhower to spy networks and, more importantly, to ULTRA. The latter was the super-secret British system for breaking the highest German military radio codes. No longer was Eisenhower's view of intelligence gathering limited to battlefield reconnaissance.

Eisenhower learned these two lessons easily. However, during the North African campaign he made the mistake of relying on only one source of intelligence. It would be a much more expensive lesson.

Lesson of Kasserine Pass

In November 1942, Eisenhower commanded Operation TORCH, the Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa. By January, his forces — the British First Army and the American II Corps — were in Tunisia. The Allied forces faced General Jurgen von Arnim's Fifth Panzer Army and Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's *Afrika Korps*.

In February 1943, British Brigadier Eric E. Mockler-Ferryman, Eisenhower's G2, reported that Arnim, with reinforcements from Rommel, would attack through Fondouk Pass with the aim of enveloping the British First Army. Unfortunately, the G2 was wrong. Instead of Fondouk Pass in the north, the Germans attacked through Faid Pass in the south.

On February 14th, a powerful German panzer attack slammed into the inexperienced American II Corps. In a series of engagements known as the battle of Kasserine Pass, they badly mauled the II Corps. Fortunately for the Americans, bickering between Arnim and Rommel stalled the attack. After pushing the Americans back over 30 miles, the Germans withdrew gaining only a tactical victory.

The Battle of Kasserine Pass gave Eisenhower much needed command experience and convinced him that a commander can't rely on a single source of intelligence. Mockler-Ferryman had based his estimate of German intentions solely on ULTRA intercepts, overlooking more traditional methods like patrolling. The ULTRA intercepts had clearly indicated a German attack through Fondouk Pass, causing a faulty Allied disposition. Eisenhower relieved Mockler-Ferryman and asked the British for a replacement. From the replacement, Eisenhower demanded "a little more inquisitiveness and greater attention to checking and cross-checking reports from various sources."²

Eisenhower's G2

The British replaced Mockler-Ferryman with Brigadier Kenneth W.D. Strong. An unpretentious Scot, Strong had a natural affinity with Americans.³ Unlike his commander, he had a great deal of experience in intelligence work; in fact, it would be hard to think of a more qualified officer. Prior to the war, he was the British assistant military attache in Berlin, and for the first year and a half of the war, he was the head of the German Section in the War Office. Later, he became the intelligence chief for the Home Forces.

Strong shared Eisenhower's belief in the use of multiple sources. "It is quite wrong," he wrote, "to think of any one source as affording a solution in isolation. Each greatly enhanced the value of the others by corroboration, elimination, and amplification."⁴ But, whatever Strong and his boss believed, ULTRA remained the most useful form of intelligence for the Allies.

Both Strong and ULTRA served Eisenhower well during the rest of the Mediterranean campaign. Before the invasion of Sicily in July 1943, the Allies knew the complete German and Italian order of battle in Sicily and Italy. Strong accurately predicted the German reaction to the Salerno landings in September 1943. It was small wonder that when Eisenhower took command of the Anglo-American forces for the invasion of France, he made Strong the G2, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEP).

The Normandy Campaign

When Eisenhower arrived in England, the planning for the invasion of France had been going on for almost a year. Intelligence collection to support this planning was also well underway.

Nevertheless, Eisenhower played a large role in the final intelligence operations before the invasion. The highly-successful deception plan, Operation FORTITUDE, was much of this role. FORTITUDE fooled the Germans into believing that the Allied invasion would begin with an assault on Norway followed by the main attack against the Pas de Calais. Strong's reports showed just how completely the Germans were fooled. Strong also supplied Eisenhower and his commanders with accurate and detailed information on enemy order of battle, capabilities and courses of action.

Eisenhower had much to do with Strong's ability to construct this accurate picture, especially after the invasion itself. Because the security-minded Germans relied heavily on land lines, ULTRA lost some of its value as a source. In part, aerial reconnaissance and Allied agents in France compensated for the limited ULTRA, but an invaluable source of information was the French Resistance. Unwilling to rely on one or even two sources of intelligence, Eisenhower increased support to and liaison with the French Resistance.

G2, SHAEF

To support Eisenhower, Strong's section was the apex of intelligence efforts against the Germans in Western Europe. The section was organized along British lines with two main subsections: Intelligence and Counterintelligence. It operated in a manner similar to FM 34-1's Intelligence Cycle: directing, collecting, processing and disseminating intelligence.⁵

SHAEF's G2 directed intelligence efforts at the operational level. Strong and his staff kept regular contact with the intelligence officers of the army groups and air forces who gave general guidance on requirements and determined priorities. Through this direction, Strong received his information. Armies and army groups sent him intelligence summaries based on a wide variety of sources, including units in contact with the enemy, tactical radio intercepts, and aerial reconnaissance. This was in addition to the ULTRA intercepts, reports from the Office of Strategic Services, and information from the French Resistance.

To process this information, Strong had a staff of over 1,000. These analysts collated and cross-checked, and then synthesized the incoming intelligence into reports for Eisenhower. Strong later noted that one sentence to Eisenhower may have been developed from over 200 intelligence

reports.

Once processed, SHAEF's intelligence was issued to lower headquarters in the form of weekly summaries, periodic estimates and ULTRA digests. Because these written summaries, estimates and digests suffered from a time lag, Strong preferred briefings. "Intelligence information and judgments," he believed, "are best delivered orally to those who need them. Most people have too much to read."⁶ Strong always briefed Eisenhower and the SHAEF staff.

Strong started the daily morning staff meeting with a detailed briefing on the enemy situation. Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, the SHAEF chief of staff, required "more information about them (the enemy) than we had of our own forces." Then, the primary staff met with Eisenhower, who also preferred oral reporting.⁷

Eisenhower treated Strong as a commander at the head of a staff section. Strong had the authority to sack anyone who was ineffective. More importantly, he wasn't to present intelligence estimates based on consensus view. Instead, his assessments were to be his beliefs. As Smith told Strong: "We've hired you for your knowledge and advice. If you are wrong too often we'll find and hire someone else in your place."⁸ Fortunately, Strong wasn't wrong that often.

Breakout and MARKET-GARDEN

In late July 1944, the Allied forces broke out of their Normandy beachhead. Throughout August and into September, the American and British armies dashed across France. The Allied command was confident that the war was nearing an end. At the end of August, Strong reported "The August battles have done it and the enemy in the West has had it." A week later, he noted that the disorganized and demoralized German Army was "no longer a cohesive force." If the attack could be pressed, the end of the war was in sight.⁹

In an effort to press the attack, Eisenhower accepted Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's plan for gaining a bridgehead across the Rhine. This plan was Operation MARKET-GARDEN. By using three airborne divisions, Montgomery hoped to leap across the Rhine near Arnhem in the Netherlands before the Germans could organize their defenses. It was a calculated risk fueled by optimism.

At first the optimism seemed justified. Strong continued to report an enemy in a dismal state. But, on the eve of the operation, he found indicators of two panzer divisions near Arnhem. When

the G2 brought these findings to Eisenhower, he told Strong to show the indicators to Montgomery. Unfortunately, the British commander waved the objections aside. MARKET-GARDEN was launched as planned but failed to achieve its objective of a bridgehead across the Rhine.

Eisenhower's failure to heed the warnings of his G2 showed the limited influence that the intelligence community has on the decision makers. Eisenhower didn't feel he should call off the operations after giving it the green light. Moreover, he had no clear reason to do so. The Germans had not stood and fought for over a month and there was no definite proof that they would now. Like all operations, MARKET-GARDEN bore the risk of failure, but with that risk came the potential of success — a bridgehead over the Rhine and the continued pursuit of the German Army.¹⁰

Autumn War of Attrition

The failure of MARKET-GARDEN marked the end of the Allied pursuit of the German armies. The front stabilized and settled into a war of attrition. In October and November, the Allies' armies maintained pressure on the entire front. By constant pressure, Eisenhower hoped to drain German manpower and prevent German movement to a better position.

Although the Allies' armies could only advance slowly, there was room for optimism. Strong estimated that the Allies were causing 4,000 German casualties a day. Likewise, they were destroying German armored forces and he believed "(t)he dwindling fire brigade is switched with increasing rapidity...from one fire to another." Although Hitler hoped to launch a counterattack, his power to do so seemed to be sharply decreasing.¹¹

In early October, Strong reported that the Germans were strengthening their Army Group B around Aachen. He noted that the German Seventh Army had withdrawn its armor and predicted that it would reappear as a panzer army so that Army Group B could have an armored force like Army Group G's Fifth Panzer Army. Later in the month, Strong estimated that the Germans would have a panzer reserve strong enough to attack the Allies. This force could be used in November for a counterattack or spoiling attack.

In November, the puzzle remained — how would Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, commander of the German forces, use his new panzer reserve? Strong believed that Rundstedt would use this force for "a final showdown before win-





ter." Logically, this showdown would come to counter the Allied thrusts toward the Ruhr industrial region.¹²

Many of these estimations were guesswork. Sources for Eisenhower and his G2 were drying up. With the Germans backed into their own country, the intelligence from resistance groups was no longer available. Bad weather restricted aerial reconnaissance. And while ULTRA intercepts were plentiful, they gave no conclusive evidence of German intentions.

The Battle of the Bulge

War always entails risk. To concentrate forces at one point, commanders often have to weaken another. It was no different for Eisenhower in December 1944. He took the calculated risk to weaken the Ardennes front to concentrate forces to the north and south for the drive to the Rhine. It seemed like a wise decision. The Ardennes, with its poor road network, wasn't suited for mobile operations, especially in the winter.¹³

Strong became increasingly concerned over this risk in the first weeks of December. While he was aware of nine panzer divisions, he was unable to locate them. At daily staff meetings, he called Eisenhower's and Smith's attention to three possible uses of these reserves:

1. Deploy to Russia.
2. Counterattack against a successful Allied penetration.
3. Stage a relieving attack in the Ardennes.

Strong believed the second option was the most likely, but Smith was so impressed by the third that he told the G2 to brief General Omar Bradley, the commander of the 12th Army Group which controlled the Ardennes, of the possibility. Bradley was confident that his forces could contain any German counterattack before the penetration became dangerous.¹⁴

The Germans proved Bradley wrong. On December 16th, Strong interrupted a meeting between Eisenhower and Bradley and told them that the Germans had launched an attack through the Ardennes. Bradley dismissed it as a spoiling attack to draw off Lieutenant General George Patton's Third Army. But Eisenhower sensed it was much more than that and ordered Bradley to send two armored divisions to the Ardennes. Later, he would send his only strategic reserves, the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, into the area.

Eisenhower's quick reaction to the threat, aided by the tenacity of the American GI and the

ability of Patton's Third Army to shift directions, sealed the doom of the Germans' last offensive in the West. By Christmas, Patton relieved the besieged garrison of Bastogne, the critical road junction, driving a salient into the Germans' southern flank. By the end of January 1945, the Americans had retaken all of the lost ground.

As with Arnhem, the Battle of the Bulge shows the limitation of an intelligence officer in changing a course of action. Strong made clear to his commander the possible threat of attack. Although hampered by a lack of information and a German deception plan, he correctly analyzed the German dispositions. In the weeks before the attack, Strong even specifically mentioned the possibility of a counterattack through the Ardennes. But Eisenhower was unwilling to change his plans.

Forrest Pogue, SHAEF's official historian, gave an excellent analysis of why Eisenhower and his commanders failed to listen to their G2's warnings. Foremost, Eisenhower's strategy was clearly offensive. By switching to the defensive and trying to react to the various threats would not only disrupt his offensives, but it would be impractical. A German attack, if it did come, would probably come against the Allied thrusts toward the Ruhr, and would be limited by shortages in gasoline. And lastly, von Rundstedt, who was thought to be in control of the German forces (in reality Hitler was), would not commit what amounted to military suicide.¹⁵

But if Strong's intelligence buildup didn't convince Eisenhower to change his courses of action, it did give him the insight to react quickly to the situation. Eisenhower was the first of the senior American leaders to realize the attack was a general offensive. And he was the first to realize the opportunity that Hitler had presented to the Americans.

The Ardennes counterattack was the last gasp in the West for the Germans. Eisenhower had little trouble in his Rhineland campaigns, the crossing of the Rhine, and the subsequent overrunning of Germany. On May 8, 1945, Germany surrendered unconditionally.

Assessments

Although he had little pre-war experience with intelligence, Eisenhower quickly realized its value to the commander. In the painful lesson of Kasserine, he learned that commanders must avoid over-reliance on a single source of intelli-

gence. He never made that mistake again. In fact, he found new approaches, like the French Resistance, to avoid it. Even when ULTRA was limited, he and his intelligence community were able to piece together an accurate picture of enemy capabilities and intentions through the use of all available sources.

The belief in the use of all sources was the basis for the effective partnership of Eisenhower and Strong, his G2. But that belief was only the starting point. Both men had much in common and worked together extremely well. As time progressed, their rapport only got better. Eisenhower learned from his British subordinate, and Strong was part of his inner circle, helping him make many of his critical decisions. Strong's presence made Eisenhower more confident.

However, despite the close relationship and professional respect between Strong and Eisenhower, the G2 was often unable to change his commander's plans. Before both MARKET-GARDEN and the Battle of the Bulge, Strong issued warnings of possible unfavorable enemy actions. But in neither case did Eisenhower change his plans. He felt that neither the situation nor the information definitively demanded it. As Strong noted about the Arnhem operation, "Our information was sufficient for me to utter a warning — intelligence can seldom do much more than that — of the potential danger from armored troops. After that it is up to the decision makers and there is no guarantee that they will heed the intelligence people."¹⁶ Clearly there are limits to what the intelligence officer can do in the decision-making process.

But this limitation should not deter the intelligence officer from giving his commander the full range of enemy capabilities. Neither Eisenhower nor Strong believed that the Germans would launch a full-scale offensive through the Ardennes. It simply didn't make sense. But it was a German capability and Strong presented it as such. When it did occur, Eisenhower wasn't shocked into inaction. If Strong had only given the most probable German course of action, Eisenhower may not have reacted so quickly and the war could have dragged on longer.

This, then, is the greatest lesson of Eisenhower's World War II experiences with intelligence: An intelligence officer must present his commander with the total picture of enemy capabilities. Otherwise, the commander won't be able to anticipate events on the battlefield and may be caught unprepared.

Author's Note: The best book on Eisenhower's war years is Stephen E. Ambrose's **The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower** (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1970).

1. Dwight D. Eisenhower, **Crusade in Europe** (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1948), p. 32.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 143 & 147. Stephen E. Ambrose, **Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment** (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1981), p. 61.
3. Strong wrote "the best time in a man's life is when he gets to like Americans." See Sir Kenneth Strong, **Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of a British Intelligence Officer** (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1969), p. 112.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 118.
5. For information on SHAEF G2 see Strong, p. 178-182. Forrest Pogue, **The Supreme Command in U.S. Army in World War II: European Theater of Operations** (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army,

- 1954) pp. 70-73.
6. Strong, p. 118.
7. Ibid., pp. 118 & 249-250.
8. Ibid., pp. 116-117.
9. Pogue, pp. 244-245.
10. Ambrose, pp. 130-135.
11. Pogue, p. 306.
12. Ibid., pp. 363-364.
13. Ibid., p. 361.
14. Ibid., p. 365; Strong, pp. 210-211.
15. Pogue, p. 372.
16. Strong quoted in Ambrose, p. 135.

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January-March 1991

THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE: THE SECRET OFFENSIVE

by Captain Kevin R. Austria

On December 16, 1944, the Germans attacked American forces in the Ardennes Forest in Belgium. That offensive, now known as the Battle of the Bulge, took the Allies by surprise. The Allied intelligence "failure" to discover the German preparations for the attack is a subject explored in almost every winter issue of one military journal or another. However, unlike the 1965 Warner Brothers film "The Battle of the Bulge," which portrayed Army staff officers as refusing to accept the probability of a German offensive, the German success in 1944 was due not so much to U.S. Army intelligence shortcomings as it was to effective German operations security (OPSEC) measures.

The German Plan

In autumn 1944 Germany remained the lone European Axis nation fighting what many Germans believed was a hopeless struggle. Italy, Romania, Bulgaria and Finland, cornerstones of defense in the east and south, surrendered or broke with Germany.¹ Hungary remained faithful but secretly negotiated with Moscow to end hostilities. Surprisingly, the loss of these allies did not significantly decrease German combat power. Since the Stalingrad disaster in 1942-43, Adolf Hitler no longer counted on his allies to field effective front line forces and relegated them to rear area security. The Axis defections did, however, stretch the Wehrmacht defensive line from Finland to the Black Sea. Meanwhile, the Red Army front was reduced as Romania and Bulgar-

ia declared war on Germany.

The combined German losses on the east and west fronts during June, July and August totaled 1,200,000 dead, wounded and missing.² Total German losses in Normandy after D-day alone exceeded over half a million men.³ Despite the heavy losses suffered by the *Wehrmacht*, Hitler was certain that replacements could be found and new divisions formed to bring the war to a more successful conclusion. German military industrial output was promising. In 1944, Germany produced more tanks, guns and aircraft than any previous war year. An average of 1,500 tanks and assault guns were shipped to the front every 30 days.

By the second week of September 1944, the German high command was encouraged by signs that German troops were beginning to get a toe hold here and there, and the enemy advance was slowing. The collective German ground forces at the beginning of September numbered 327 divisions and brigades, of which 31 divisions and 13 brigades were armored. These forces were pitiful compared to the armies available for the 1940 and 1941 invasions. However, the amount of military frontage that the Germans had to contend with in the west shrunk considerably.

Hitler knew that he could not win the war in the conventional sense. What Germany needed in 1944 was a quick victory capable of bearing immediate diplomatic fruit. A fanatical believer in the Clausewitzian doctrine of the offensive as the purest and only decisive form of war, Hitler had to decide whether his projected counteroffensive should be made in the east or the west.⁴ Ter-



ritorially, the German Reich of December 1944 was larger than it was in 1939. German garrisons continued to occupy Crete, Rhodes and the other Dodecanese Islands, as well as several French ports and the Channel Islands. The remainder of the German army was conducting an orderly withdrawal from the Balkans despite heavy Yugoslav partisan activity. In Italy, Field Marshall Albert Kesselring halted the Allied advance along the Po River.

In September the Soviets entered East Prussia, but German counterattacks drove them from all but a few kilometers of the territory. "Greater Germany's" Eastern Frontier was secure — at least for the time being. To most of Hitler's planners, the eastern front was more deserving of immediate action. Developments on the western front decided the issue.

In the autumn of 1944, Allied operations took place primarily along the Dutch-German border. After seizing the German city of Aachen and securing the area around the city, the U.S. 2nd and 28th Infantry Divisions struggled southeast of Aachen in the Huertgen Forest.⁵ The Ninth Army pushed to the Roer River east of Aachen but was unable to go further due to the heavy German resistance.

Along the Ardennes-Eifel front, Americans pierced the German West Wall defenses in several places. The West Wall, designed and built in 1937-1939, was unoccupied and badly neglected in mid-1944. In addition, the fortification's defenses were designed to defeat troops, tanks

and tactics of 1939. In 1944, U.S. tanks had little trouble traversing its obstacles and Army engineers made short work of German pillboxes. Regardless, German resistance stiffened along the frontier and what remained of the West Wall was quickly fortified.

As Hitler began more detailed planning for his offensive, one factor remained constant — the goal of destroying the British and Canadian armies.⁶ The attack was intended to tear a 100 mile gap in the front of the First U.S. Army. Not only would this capture a major Allied logistics center, but it would also isolate British and Canadian forces in Holland. Additionally, the attack would also relieve pressure on the German Saar Basin as it was believed that the Americans would quickly shift forces to the north to deal with the German offensive (Map 1).

Most of Hitler's generals objected to the established objectives of the offensive. Most felt it had little chance of success; that the carefully hoarded panzer and mechanized divisions would be quickly swallowed up in the Belgian terrain. Sparsely populated, hilly, heavily forested and cut by deep gorges, the Ardennes had few roads capable of supporting heavy tanks and vehicles.⁷ Worse yet, the bulk of the armored forces was to be in the north, with only paratroop divisions and mechanized infantry holding the southern shoulder. If the offensive did get close to Antwerp, the left flank would be dangerously exposed.

Efforts to persuade Hitler to alter the attack to a limited operation against the U.S. forces around Aachen fell on deaf ears. Antwerp was to be the target, and secret German weather teams in Greenland and Spitzbergen guaranteed that bad weather would limit Allied air power. Hitler told his minister of armaments, Albert Speer:

"A single breakthrough on the western front...will lead to collapse and panic among the Americans. We'll drive right through their middle and take Antwerp...And a tremendous pocket will encircle the entire English army, with hundreds of thousands of prisoners (just) like we used to do in Russia."⁸

On October 22, an initial version of the plan, named *Wacht am Rhein* (Watch on the Rhine), was briefed to a limited number of generals. The name, deceptive in itself, indicated an operation along the Rhine River. Another name for the operation was *Abweherschlacht im Westen* (Defensive Battle in the West) which reinforced the notion that the Germans would fight a defensive battle. The deception passed to both German

commanders and allied agents painted a scenario where "Germany feared the U.S. First and Ninth Armies would achieve a real breakthrough and drive to the Rhine in the sector between Cologne and Bonn; in preparation for this event, the Fuehrer was amassing a major counterattack force northwest of Cologne; a secondary and relatively small force of burned-out divisions was being gathered in the Eifel to contain the right flank of the expected allied penetration."

So strict was the limitation of knowledge that only those in the headquarters charged with the command of the counteroffensive, including Field Marshals Gerd von Rundstedt and Walter Model were aware of the plan.⁹ It was not until December 1 that division commanders were briefed on the operation.¹⁰ Until the last hours before the attack, western front German commanders accepted the idea that the massing of materiel and the progressive withdrawal of divisions from the line was intended to provide fresh troops for the defense of the Ruhr and the Palatinate.¹¹

The American Intelligence Estimate

The United States Command was aware that German armored forces, specifically the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies, were moving into the vicinity of Cologne. They believed these units would counterattack the American Forces west of the Roer River.¹² This was the accepted German plan for several reasons.

First, the land between the Roer and Rhine Rivers is level and is ideal for tank warfare. It made a great deal of sense for the Germans to use their superior tanks to good effect in this area. Also, a counterattack there would thwart the American advance into Germany's industrial Ruhr Valley.

Another reason was the appointment of Field Marshall Gerd von Rundstedt as the German Commander in Chief of the Western Theater. The Allied appraisal of von Rundstedt was that he was an excellent soldier. His stubborn defense in the fall of 1944 earned him the reputation of being rational and effective. For the defense of Germany, the Allies expected he would adeptly use his dwindling assets, counterattack at the opportune time, then fall back to the Rhine for a major defensive battle.¹³ While the American press would later label the attack the "Rundstedt Offensive," at the time, the 70-year-old field marshal sulked in his headquarters and left the planning to Hitler, and the work to Model.¹⁴

Concealing the Buildup

German movement to assembly areas was mostly by rail. The trains, hidden in tunnels or forests by day, moved by night to appointed areas.¹⁵ Railroads fed into the Eifel from Koblenz, Cologne and lesser Rhine bridgeheads between the two.¹⁶ Even though the German railway system suffered air attack for years it was still able to shuttle troops from one front to another with only moderate delays. On 10 and 11 December, daylight raids on the Koblenz rail yards left over 100 craters, and yet 24 hours later they were back in full operation.¹⁷ By December 11 most of the buildup was complete thanks to the efforts of the German railroad system.¹⁸ Between 16 September and 16 December, 1,500 troop trains and 500 supply trains brought forward 12 armored and 29 infantry divisions with 1,420 tank and assault guns, together with 15,000 tons of ammunition¹⁹ and 3.8 million gallons of fuel.²⁰

In all, the Germans refitted 35 divisions and created 15 *Volksgrenedier* divisions. In doing so, the Germans unwittingly deceived allied intelligence. Allied intelligence only recently became aware of the raising of *Volkssturm* units and somehow tied the two together. *Volkssturm* were local militia intended for the defense of Germany. *Volksgrenediers* were regular army mechanized infantry. The mistaken Allied fusion of the two organizations only reinforced the notion that the Germans were going to fight a defensive battle.

Though the Germans were able to assemble a considerable amount of combat power against the U.S. Forces, German divisions were still considerably smaller than their American counterparts. For example, the 9th Armored Division had almost 220 tanks of all types (including M-10 tank destroyers) in contrast to the 9th Panzer Division's 100 tanks and assault guns. The average panzer division could at best field 130 tanks.

The heavy drain of the long war forced the German Army to reduce the strength of its infantry divisions from 17 thousand to just under 13 thousand men and to cut one of the battalions from each of three infantry regiments. At slightly over 14 thousand men, the American division had a thousand more men than the German division. The attachment of artillery and a tank destroyer battalion to almost every U.S. infantry division made the American division considerably stronger in firepower than the German *Volksgrenedier* division and at least equal to the Panzer *Grenadier* (armored infantry) division.²¹ Addi-

tionally, the dissected nature of the terrain limited the number of German divisions that could be committed at one time.

One of the main participants in the coming battle was the Sixth Panzer Army, which maintained its headquarters in Cologne with four of its armored divisions. Its position indicated operations in the north, possibly against U.S. forces in Aachen. With the aid of false radio traffic, a ghost army known as the 25th with a notional order of ten divisions was identified in the vicinity of Cologne.²²

The success of the Germans in concealing the presence of this great force for so long was due to a combination of rigid discipline and limiting their reconnaissance to a few high ranking officers.²³ Activity was kept to a minimum. Assault formations were forbidden to make reconnaissances in the zone of attack.²⁴ Combat patrols were limited to nighttime searches for American patrols and artillery registration was permitted only by guns in the line, and then only to a few rounds per day.²⁵

Terrain gave the attackers a distinct advantage. As the most extensive stands of forest are close to the German frontier, so too is the most forbidding terrain. For almost the entire length of the frontier, the terrain poses a major obstacle to military movement²⁶ but is well adapted to concealment.

The Germans used the forest cover to good advantage. Camouflage officers in the villages in the rear were responsible for getting new units under cover; all military road-signs were strictly forbidden and no one except the reinforced detachments of traffic police were allowed to guide the units.²⁷ To prevent detection, most units were held at least 12 miles from the front until Hitler gave the order for the final assembly.²⁸ Supplied with prime movers, winches and sand, a special roads service was organized to assist tanks and vehicles in distress and move them from the roads and trails before daylight.²⁹ Tanks moved up to their final attack positions under the cover of noise of low flying aircraft.³⁰ Wheels were wrapped in straw and roads covered with hay to muffle the sound of movement.³¹

To conserve gasoline and hold down the sound of motors, ammunition for the opening barrage was moved up by hand, one round at a time.³² Some of the needed supplies, such as fuel, were moved forward only sparingly. As a result, the armored formations would start the attack with meager fuel reserves. Hitler counted on their

ability to resupply themselves with captured American stocks.³³ The planned dependence on captured fuel stocks significantly reduced the amount of traffic in the rear.

Imagery Intelligence

The U.S. Air Force's 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Group assigned a low priority to flights over the troop build up area in the Eifel region. However, on the few flights they did make, they observed trains carrying tanks and ambulances. In addition, they reported truck convoys and supplies positioned in the tree lines alongside roads. These sightings were regarded as movements of personnel and equipment through the Eifel en route from the south to the north to form the expected counterattack.³⁴

In support of the offensive the Germans were unable to disguise the fact that 90 ground attack planes and nearly 1,500 fighter aircraft were forward based.³⁵ Many of the squadrons now included the two new jet aircraft, the Messerschmitt 262 fighter-bomber and the Arado 234 reconnaissance-bomber. These aircraft, in particular, required longer runways and special support. It is unknown why allied intelligence failed to pick up this fact.³⁶

Communication Security

Communications security was a vital part of the deception. To prevent communications intercept, Hitler forbade transmission by telephone, telegraph or wireless of any information that could in any way be connected with the offensive.³⁷ To enforce these measures, special security detachments roamed the Eifel to ensure that only those units actually facing the enemy were using radios.³⁸

The use of the commercial telephone was a significant threat to German operations. Throughout the autumn and winter of 1944, commercial telephone lines between Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium were still operational. It was possible for a German-speaking American to telephone into the Reich from American occupied territory.³⁹ Indeed, during the actual attack, German-speaking residents in the American occupied Belgian town of Malmedy were telephoning intelligence to their German army relatives a few miles away.⁴⁰

Likewise, German military telephone lines were subject to intercept. Much of the phone system had been installed in 1938 in the West Wall fortifications. Portions of the line were captured

by the Americans in September, and not knowing how much of the system was functional, the German army was discouraged from using it. Much to the dismay of allied commanders, the German army stubbornly refused to reveal what it was up to.⁴¹

Signals Intelligence

ULTRA was not as revealing as one might expect in informing the Allies of the German offensive. Although Hitler did not consider the German code to have been compromised (which it was), he wanted communications concerning this key operation kept to a minimum. ULTRA did, however, intercept some traffic of value. One such message requested fighter air cover over rail terminals in the Eifel. Interestingly enough, high priority requests for air reconnaissance of Meuse River bridges were intercepted but had no significance placed on them. It is possible that the Allies believed the emphasis on German air operations was linked solely to assessing the V-1 and V-2 terror attacks on Antwerp.

In summary, ULTRA was ineffective because it was not specific. In the past, ULTRA information was reliable and clear. Messages intercepted prior to the Battle of the Bulge did not specifically mention an offensive, so their significance was questioned.⁴²

Human Intelligence

The Ardennes-Eifel frontier is predominantly a German area so the German intelligence service had no difficulty infiltrating agents. Some of the German agents infiltrated into the Ardennes had lived there during the Nazi occupation. One Gestapo agent actually moved back into his old apartment having kept the key when he fled the previous September.⁴³ The relationship between the residents of this area and their German relations was heavily exploited. Indeed, many of the families in the region has sons serving in the German army. German spymaster Lieutenant Colonel Hermann Giskes used this to his advantage. Giskes was tasked with spreading deception to the inner workings of allied agencies. To do this he spread false information to labor camp internees who were allowed to "escape." When the Luxembourgiens and Belgians reached allied lines they told their tales to American officers.⁴⁴

The possibility of deserters remained a big problem during the preparation for the attack, especially among those known as *Volksdeutsch*

(individuals of German ancestry serving in the German Army). The Ardennes made an ideal location to go AWOL.⁴⁵ To minimize the risk of deserters, soldiers from Alsace, Belgium and Luxembourg were transferred to the interior, and a strict schedule of roll calls was begun.⁴⁶ In addition, Heinrich Himmler issued an edict that stated that the family of any man who defected would automatically be sent to a concentration camp.⁴⁷


General von Manteuffel himself contributed to the deception. As soon as his army was in place, Manteuffel went to a cafe on the border of Germany and Luxembourg and boasted loudly about a coming German offensive in the north. He even went so far as to disguise himself as an army colonel prior to making a reconnaissance of the front lines so that his presence would not attract attention.⁴⁸

Despite the German OPSEC measures, the American forces had HUMINT indicators of a coming attack. In late November 1944, a German order requesting volunteers who could speak the American dialect of English was obtained.⁴⁹ This order stated that a special reconnaissance unit using American equipment would be formed. Hitler personally organized the panzer brigade led by SS Lieutenant Colonel Otto Skorzeny. Skorzeny's 150th Panzer Brigade was dressed in American uniforms and equipped with captured American tanks, jeeps, arms and identification.⁵⁰ During the battle, the 150th Panzer Brigade attempted to masquerade as an American unit behind American lines and seize bridges over the Meuse River, with a secondary mission of cutting phone lines and spreading panic.

On 14 December, two German prisoners disclosed that an offensive was to begin between 17 and 25 December and that all soldiers were to report back to their units by December 11th. Other indicators, including the capture of unit movement orders and a copy of von Rundstedt's attack order were pigeonholed in a maze of administrative channels.⁵¹

The Offensive Fails

Military accounts differ, but the German offensive reached its peak between 25 and 27 December (Map 2). In the north of the Bulge, the German First SS Panzer Division attempted to make its way to the Meuse River by a route north of St. Vith. This attack was blunted and forced back into the Bulge. To the south, the German Seventh Army and Fifth Panzer Army were unable to take the road center of Bastogne, and by 26 December,



The German Plan December, 1944



The Ardennes December 27, 1944

Patton's Third Army broke through to the encircled town.

At its western tip, German armor reached within six miles of the Meuse before halting for lack of fuel, and then dueling for two days with British and American tanks. Most German commanders knew that the offensive was finished. Generals, like the famed panzer expert Heinz Guderian, petitioned Hitler to halt the offensive and release the remaining forces for service on the east front. These requests were refused until late January 1945. By then the Russian offensive was bearing down on Warsaw and moving to cut off East Prussia.

The Germans inflicted severe damage on the U.S. First Army during the Ardennes battle. This was compounded by Allied losses in the south from *Nordwind* (a two-pronged attack in France that almost forced the allies to abandon Strasbourg) and a New Year's day raid by a thousand *Luftwaffe* planes. However, the U.S. Army could make good its losses in three weeks where the Germans could never replace lost soldiers and equipment. At best, the Germans delayed the Allied advance into the Saar and set back General Eisenhower's planned offensive to seize the Roer dams. Worse for the Germans, they threw away their chance to strike a devastating blow against the Soviet forces and delay their advance into Germany.

Analysis of Indicators

The Allies were so firmly convinced the Germans were preparing for a counterattack between the Roer and Rhine Rivers that it affected their analysis of indicators. The analysis was twisted to support the expected counterattack.⁵² So complete was the deception that on 15 December, von Rundstedt's intelligence staff could find no sign that the Americans discovered anything. Communications intelligence detachments reported that continued American carelessness in the use of radio and commercial telephone indicated that no U.S. reinforcements were moving to the Ardennes area.⁵³

Conclusion

Did the indicators warn of an attack? There were some indicators that by themselves would lead one to believe a German offensive through the Ardennes was imminent. However, when all available indicators were analyzed, the attack in the Ardennes was not so obvious. The greatest Allied delusion was that they believed it was von

Rundstedt who controlled events in the West.⁵⁴ Other factors which must be considered are good deception by the Germans, von Rundstedt's past conduct of defensive warfare, and ULTRA's failure to provide the information that commanders had come to expect. Intelligence officers, who were supposed to be born pessimists, were vying with each other for the honor of devastating the German war machine by underestimating its strength and capabilities.⁵⁵

Finally, the German attack was a lost gamble. They did not seize their primary objectives of Liege and Namur on the Meuse River, much less the final objective of Antwerp. Hitler underestimated Eisenhower's authority and ability to quickly move divisions to the threatened area.⁵⁶ It is easier to predict an enemy's course of action if it is rational. But it is much more difficult to predict a course of action which has reduced chances of success and actually diminishes the country's defense posture.

Endnotes

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5. Thomas E. Greiss, *The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean*, The West Point Military History Series (Wayne, N.J.: Avery Publishing, 1984), p. 364.
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26. MacDonald, p. 26.

27. Nobecourt, p. 120.

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A GI and a Chocolate Bar: Another Legacy



by Major Calvin E. Brown

The first time I shook Gerhard Sennewald's hand, he made three rapid statements, "The last time I saw an American soldier was in 1945 when he bounced me on his knee and fed me chocolate. I hate the Russians. I hate communism." Gerhard is from the city of Erfurt, in former East Germany.

I met Gerhard in April 1990 at a birthday party for my German friend Manfred Job, a baker whose family had adopted mine. I am a U.S. Army officer serving in Heidelberg, Germany.

The Jobs were careful to tell me that Gerhard and his family would be at the party. Although there were serious cracks in the Berlin Wall, communism was still very much alive. I was excited and curious to meet this man, his wife and 20-year-old daughter Prisca.

My wife Dianne, my two daughters and I arrived at the party bearing American beer. It was a small family gathering. There was an air of excitement concerning the meeting of Americans and East Germans. All stood as introductions were made. Gerhard's intense smile and opening statements immediately put me at ease.

During the course of the evening the conversa-

tion continued in broken German and English as stories began to unfold of life under the communists: shortages, confiscation, terror of secret police and repression. I was fascinated by Gerhard and his family. It was obvious that they were fascinated by these "typical Americans."

Gerhard, a handsome man with silver, wavy hair, worked as an auto mechanic. Baerbel, a beautiful, slender blonde, raised flowers and vegetables. I was amazed at her hands: large and powerful, they bespoke of much hard labor.

I was invited outside to see the family auto, a six year old Polish built Fiat, quite a luxury in East Germany where one can wait ten years for a new car with 1950's technology. It didn't seem appropriate to show Gerhard my new van with all its electronic gadgetry.

We returned to the celebration and began sampling my American beer and Gerhard's gift of East German beer, followed by the customary champagne and schnapps. It was after this that I noticed that Gerhard's English improved dramatically and I'm sure my German was near flawless. As we readied ourselves to leave, my little girls ran to Gerhard for hugs and kisses. I stuck out my hand only to have it slapped away and I found myself embraced in a great bear hug, some-

thing a German would normally never do! He made me promise to come to his hometown when the wall was completely down and the borders opened. I promised.

I didn't sleep well that night. The events of the evening kept replaying themselves like a black and white movie. The next morning Dianne also confessed to sleeplessness, and neither one of us could explain why. "Let's do something for Gerhard and his family," I suggested. I knew they were visiting the famous Heidelberg Castle that morning and would return late in the day to begin their trip home. We scurried around the house looking for gifts. I found a new leather wallet for Gerhard that I had received for Christmas but hadn't used. Dianne found similar gifts, a cotton running suit for Prisca and embroidered towels for Baerbel. We ran to the nearby American shopping center and bought a case of American beer, soda, some cereal and cookies, then topped it off with California champagne. We wrapped each gift separately. Later, when we took them to the Jobs it looked like Christmas!

That evening we received a call from Birgit Job, Manfred's wife. "When they came in and saw all the brightly wrapped presents their eyes were wide," she said. "But, when they were told the presents were for them, from their American friends, the whole family burst into tears."

At that moment, I realized why I had been so disturbed the previous night. For years as a professional soldier I had studied communism, dedicating my life to opposing it or any other system that oppressed humanity. Now I had faces and names, relationships with people who were the victims of the system I opposed. If the wall continued to crumble, I would go to Erfurt.

On October 3, 1990, the two Germanies were united. No more border, no more East and West, one Federal Republic of Germany. And with it no travel restrictions for Americans except to areas with remaining Soviet installations. On Saturday, October 6th, Dianne and I, along with another couple, headed for Gerhard's home in the former DDR.

We left the Autoban at the old border crossing site in order to travel backroads through small villages. Changes were coming fast and we wanted to see the former DDR before they occurred. Scarcely a kilometer off the Autoban, in the dark shadow of the old border fence and guard towers, we entered the tiny village of Berka. A marching band was standing in the middle of the street, girls were in native costume, men were holding

bottles of ribbon festooned *kirschwasser* (a strong clear liqueur). They had been waiting for an American car. We were stopped, surrounded. The band struck up a lively tune, girls danced, people rushed into the street so that mothers could let their children see the Americans. I rolled down my window and *kirschwasser* was pushed inside. I got out and joined the dance. As an American soldier I've been to many places where I wasn't exactly welcomed, but here I was treated like a king! On this day, in this place, it was an honor to be an American.

We were again on our way down rough cobblestone roads, through villages where the only bright colors were new German flags. We stopped at Wartburg Castle near Eisenach where another revolution had taken place in 1526, when Martin Luther translated the New Testament into German, initiating the Protestant Reformation.

Then it was on to Erfurt. Gerhard and Prisca met us at a *gasthaus* with enormous smiles and crushing bearhugs. "I can't believe this is happening," he says over and over. Dianne rides with Gerhard in the Fiat while Prisca experiences her first ride in an American luxury car. If only Detroit could have bottled the fascination!

At Gerhard's home we meet Baerbel and another daughter, Astrid. The daughters served as interpreters for the weekend. We exchanged small gifts, a giant fruit basket for the Sennewalds and flower arrangements for us. Gerhard's grandchildren, Marcos and Desiree, gave us outdated DDR flags and dried flowers they'd arranged themselves. Some neighbors were invited in and we all had Baerbel's famous hot apple strudel. Only later did we realize the neighbors had come to meet the Americans.

Gerhard took us to see his city. An American doesn't understand the pride Europeans have in their cities and their knowledge of local history. Gerhard was no exception. We visited the Dom Platz with its beautiful cathedral, where Gerhard bought us copies of every post card in the souvenir shop. A walking tour of the old city followed. Reconstruction is well under way — here a building's under renovation, there a decrepit structure. As we moved deeper into the old city we discovered buildings that hadn't been touched since the war. "We have the communists to thank for this," Gerhard said. I was amazed, for the Allies certainly had caused the destruction and yet the blame for present conditions rested solely on the government of the last 45 years. There is an education in his attitude.

Several shops were stocked with food and the latest clothing styles from the West. Prisca told us that these things had only been available since July and they were very expensive. "Before July the windows were full, but there was nothing to buy." As she spoke I noticed a sadness on her face. I had seen the same look on the faces of many of her countrymen. "This too will be repaired," I told myself.

We continued on to the STASI (former secret police) headquarters and prison. Here Gerhard reaffirmed his hatred of the former regime.

We finished off with a driving tour, passing several former DDR military barracks that now belonged to the Federal Republic. We stopped on a hilltop overlooking the darkening city. Prisca told us about new plans to rebuild utilities and factories and to remodel the markets.

The tour ended at home where Baerbel had prepared a beautiful spread of fancy coldcuts, cheese and *bratzen* (hard rolls) using her finest table service. Their third daughter, Uta, with husband, Randolph, joined us. They are Marcos' and Desiree's parents. I thought Randolph must be a businessman from the suit he wore, but I later discovered he was a truck driver. Everyone had worn their very best for the Americans. For the second time that day I felt like royalty!

We spent the evening eating, drinking, exchanging stories and asking lots of questions. Gerhard showed us pictures of himself in the army and of his father, a German officer in World War II, who died when Gerhard was four. He displayed his American music collection: Johnny Cash, John Phillip Sousa's marches and, of course, Elvis. I gave the children an American dollar which they attached to sheets of paper which each of us signed, "In Memory of the Occasion." Throughout the evening Gerhard would look at me or squeeze my arm and say, "I can't believe I have an American in my home!"

I asked Prisca why we were invited and why we were being treated so special. "All our lives our father told us about the kindness of the Americans. When the Americans came in 1945 the war ended. When the Russians came a few months later the war started all over again. When we grow up we must be like the Americans."

The next day, after a hearty breakfast, Baerbel noticed that it was DDR Day, no longer a national holiday. Germany was united and there were Americans in her kitchen. I asked for the calendar and each of us signed it "In Memory of the

Occasion."

Following breakfast, Astrid asked if I would like to drive her Trabant, a small East German, 2 cylinder, underpowered, pollution spewing little car that tops out at 58 miles per hour. The little "Trabi's," as they are called, are the butt of many jokes on both sides of the political arena. "How can you double the value of a Trabi? Fill the tank with gasoline!" This high tech aviator took quite a ribbing when I had difficulty getting the little car around the block. It took a lot of nursing to get it to go. Ralph Nader gets new respect from me!

Goodbyes were said, promises to return were given, and we traveled home. All we could talk about were the experiences of the previous 48 hours. I'm sure Gerhard's family did the same. We wondered what they thought of us, whether they were as impressed with us as we were with them?


I think often of a moment on Saturday night as the children were bidding us goodnight. As I stood with Marcos and Desiree I said to Gerhard, "Forty-five years ago an American soldier bounced you on his knee and gave you chocolate. Now, 45 years later, an American soldier gives your grandchildren chocolate." With those words we presented giant Hershey bars to the children. It was meant to be a lighthearted moment. But all of us immediately recognized the significance of this simple act, the solemnity of the occasion. Gerhard sat speechless, his eyes revealing a scene played out as a child, when a GI bounced a little boy on his knee...and gave him chocolate.

I don't know who you were, soldier, but you and thousands like you built bonds that 45 years of communist rule couldn't destroy. From the latest generation of soldiers, thank you so much.

Editor's Note: This is a departure from the material we normally print in *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, but we felt the message was very appropriate.

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HUMINT AND THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR



By Colonel Don Ullmann

Events on the international scene over the past months have forced the military establishments of the East and West to do a lot of rethinking. The prospect of large force reductions in our Army has often caused personnel-related issues to take center stage in our minds. While that is certainly understandable, we can't let issues related to Military Intelligence fall by the wayside. Finally it seems that our nation is calling for continued excellence in its intelligence agencies as the probability of high intensity conflict decreases. To not use that inherent charter to refreshen our thinking would be an unpardonable error on our part.

The Military Intelligence Corps must at last come to grips with the concept of the "operational level of war." The U.S. Army War College has been struggling in recent years to pioneer the doctrine associated with this concept; yet, we in MI seem firmly fixed with our notions of strategic intelligence, which we call echelons above corps (EAC) and tactical, which we label echelons corps and below (ECB). Where does the operational level of war fit into these notions?

The role of intelligence support at the three levels of war will be easier to illustrate if cast against the background of a single intelligence discipline. I have chosen human resource intelligence (HUMINT) because of my long familiarity with that discipline.

Tactical HUMINT has presented few problems

in definition. In recent years it has come to be understood to consist of two elements: prisoner of war interrogation and long range surveillance. These two subelements of tactical HUMINT are descriptive enough on their own for us to see why they would be of major importance to the most forward deployed, tactical commander. The major issue for tactical HUMINT for the Army of the 1990's is the organizational level at which it should be located. Whereas the divisional MI battalion of the 1980's played a key role in the tactical HUMINT arena, current force restructuring deliberations might result in all tactical HUMINT assets being located at the corps MI brigade. The definitional purity of tactical HUMINT being an ECB function will therefore be maintained, regardless of the ultimate decision to locate it at either the corps or division level or continue with it at both levels. Definitional purity, however, is not a certainty at levels above ECB.

Army EAC HUMINT's venture into the Third World low-intensity conflict (LIC) environment during the 1980's soon led it to realize that it was not the sole strategic player on the Third World block. The HUMINT of national-level agencies and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was already there. It was the potential conflict between Army EAC HUMINT and higher level HUMINT that led to serious discussions concerning what job each should be doing in the way of satisfying intelligence requirements.¹ I contend that it was out of these discussions the concept-

al difference between operational HUMINT and strategic HUMINT became clear. The key to defining the two lies in the question, "what is the relationship of the commander of a unified or specified command or counternarcotics joint task force to the intelligence requirement?"

The HUMINT of national-level agencies and DIA responds **primarily** to the intelligence requirements of the National Command Authorities and their staffs and agencies in Washington. There are, of course, instances where the intelligence which they develop would be of major interest to the theater of war commanders. Satisfaction of the intelligence requirements of the CINCs, however, is not their main business. This level of HUMINT is clearly of the strategic type. That would appear to leave the warfighting CINC as the key to unlocking the riddle of where operational HUMINT fits into the overall picture.

That is a correct statement. If the intelligence requirement which is to be satisfied by HUMINT is issued by a CINC, then the level of HUMINT involved is properly called operational. This is an important distinction. It shifts our focus away from the vain attempt to see whether the subject matter of the requirement itself is strategic or tactical. For example, in a theater of war engaged in mid- to high-intensity conflict, the CINC may not show undue concern with the level of activity of insurgencies in a given sector. Those guerrillas would, however, be of interest to the local commander in that sector. The HUMINT targeted against them, then, would correctly be tactical HUMINT, doctrinally relegated to the MI brigade or battalion. In a LIC environment, however, the CINC may be keenly concerned with the activity of an insurgent group. The intelligence requirement levied on HUMINT assets to collect against this group would properly be tasked to the operational HUMINT organization, usually found in the EAC MI brigade in the direct support role. It goes without saying that the tactical HUMINT organization in theater would be responding to other HUMINT-oriented tasking levied by some commander subordinate to the CINC. What we have heretofore called echelons above corps human resource intelligence, with the implication that it was strategic HUMINT, is thus more properly called operational HUMINT.

Is there then any strategic HUMINT within Army intelligence? The answer is usually no. There is strategic HUMINT within DOD but primarily it is located within the DIA. The Army does have operational HUMINT units which on

occasion answer strategic requirements that a CINC may generate. DIA, on the other hand, does not usually conduct HUMINT at the operational level. The HUMINT organizations of the other services, now called Service HUMINT Agencies, primarily conduct operational HUMINT aimed at satisfying the requirements of the CINCs and their component commanders.

As the Army begins to withdraw from its long established, forward-based locations overseas, it is well to remember that EAC HUMINT units can provide support to theater commanders in direct support within the specific theater or in general support from CONUS. The actual location of the EAC HUMINT unit has nothing to do with the conduct of operational HUMINT. What remains the critical factor is that the EAC unit is trying to satisfy an intelligence requirement levied by a warfighting CINC.

The role of MI in the newly emerging international environment is yet to be determined to its full extent. Clearly, things are going to be done a lot differently than they were in the recent past. The role of the warfighting CINC in the future will be strengthened even more than it was in the mid to late 1980's. This operational level of warfare at which a warfighting CINC is engaged is finally here to stay. It is high time then for the MI disciplines to take the plunge and define their doctrine to account for the three levels of warfare instead of the mere two with which they have long been comfortable.

Endnotes

1. August 1986 discussions between the Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence, Department of the Army and his HUMINT staff and the Director of Attaches and Operations, DIA and his staff to "define the HUMINT sandbox." The author was present in the role of Chief, DAMI-ISH, Directorate of Intelligence Systems, ODCSINT, DA.

Colonel Don Ullmann is a 1964 graduate of the United States Military Academy. Following an initial tour with Armor in the first armor battalion sent to Vietnam, he branch-transferred to Military Intelligence in 1967. Throughout the next two decades he served in various HUMINT and FAO (Western Europe) positions. Ullmann is a graduate of the College of Naval Command and Staff and the Army War College. He is currently the Commander, U.S. Army Operations Group, INSCOM.

CAREER NOTES

All officers are responsible for ensuring their records are up-to-date and accurate. Any DA level selection board looks at three standard items: a DA photo, an Officer Record Brief, and a microfiche (containing all OERs, records of training and awards).

A DA photo reflecting accurate rank is required every five years. A new photo should be taken when changes occur, such promotions, additional awards, etc. Take someone with you when it's taken and ensure that your photo is of good quality, clearly showing that you are fit and within Army height/weight standards.

An ORB should be a snapshot of your career, including all military and civilian education/training as well as an accurate assignment history. Personnel Service Companies have the responsibility and access to update most portions of the ORB and should be the start point for any ORB update.

Your microfiche should include all AERs/OERs. Ensure that all Efficiency Reports are present. Send any data to be added or deleted to a microfiche or requests for copies of microfiche to:

Commander
PERSCOM
ATTN: TAPC-MSR-S
200 Stovall Street
Alexandria, VA 22332

The following is your MI Branch team. These officers will remain in place at least through June 1991:

MI Branch Chief	LTC Barry D. Miner
LTC Assignments	MAJ John Defreitas
MAJ Assignments	CPT Michael Bisacre
CPT Assignments	CPT Chris Munn
LT Assignments	CPT Ed Clark
WO Assignments	CW4 Robert P. McGinnis
Professional Development Officer	CPT Linda Gould

NOTE: The Lieutenants Assignments Officer assigns all company grade officers INTO the Transition/Advanced Courses. Follow-on assignments to the Advanced Course are made by the Captains Assignments Officer once an officer

ARRIVES at the advanced course, not **BEFORE**.

The following is a list of the Military Intelligence Officer Transition and Common Core Advanced Courses through FY 91:

MIOTC CLASS NO.	REPORT DATE
91-02	8 JAN 91
91-03	28 FEB 91
91-04	2 MAY 91
91-05	24 JUL 91
92-01	16 OCT 91

MIOAC CLASS NO.	REPORT DATE
91-02	23 JAN 91
91-03	15 MAR 91
91-04	7 MAY 91
91-05	7 JUL 91
92-01	26 SEP 91

New Training Strategy for Counterintelligence Personnel

On October 1, 1990, the Intelligence Center implemented a new strategy for accessing and training counterintelligence agents, MOS 97B. The Center has ceased training 97B AIT soldiers as CI Assistants and is now training them as CI Agents in a new 17-week CI Agent Course (97B10). The CI Agent Course (97B20) was terminated and all in-service 97B accessions will attend the new CI Agent Course as well.

This new strategy has several advantages:

- It saves the Army the TDY costs of sending soldiers to Fort Huachuca for transition training.
- It eliminates long delays many 97B10 soldiers experience awaiting the Transition Course.
- It enhances the operational capabilities of MI units.

This strategy also increases the recruitment age of 97B10s from 18 to 20 years. This will minimize the time lost to the gaining command before a soldier can fully perform CI Agent duties. Army policy states an Agent must be 21 years old to be issued a badge and credentials.

The current 97B20 Transition Course will continue through FY 94 or until all of the CI Assistants currently in the field have been trained up to 20 level standards.

TOTAL FORCE



by Colonel Joseph T. Mesch

OPERATION DESERT SHIELD

Citizen-soldiers from the Army Reserve and National Guard are mobilizing and deploying from Fort Huachuca and from other stations throughout the country -- a clear depiction of the Total Force in action. Unlike our role in Vietnam when many persons joined a Guard or Reserve unit to avoid combat, the situation is different today. Soldiers in the RC units are being called up and deployed routinely as part of the Total Force in support of DESERT SHIELD.

The typical soldier serving in an RC unit is older, probably heavier and usually a long time resident of his or her community. Therefore, mobilizing the milkman, factory worker, the deputy sheriff, school teacher, parish priest, garbage collector, and the city manager brings the war home to each community. This process of local community involvement allows the nation to embrace and support our commitment. This is the way the Total Force was designed to work -- to ensure the nation supports the war fully or withdraws.

RC MI Training = ITAAS

Nothing is more important for a Ready Reserve than training. As DESERT SHIELD shows, RC soldiers must always be ready. We all must take full advantage of available training opportunities. Most RC soldiers can't afford the time to attend the long active component courses to become MI MOS qualified. While all IET for new RC soldiers takes place at the Intelligence Center just as with AC soldiers, additional MOS training and professional development takes place at each of the Intelligence Army Area Schools or ITAAS. Since 1947, the various ITAAS

have trained RC soldiers in MI skills. The MI proponent works continuously to reconfigure AC "long" courses into two week increments suitable for RC annual training. With two full timers assigned, the ITAAS often conduct year round operations and essentially do a great job. Even though the ITAAS is a FORSCOM entity structured in each Army area, the Intelligence Center has a special relationship with the five RC MI schools. Primary mobilization sites for four of these schools are Fort Huachuca and Fort Devens. The Intelligence Center evaluates each ITAAS and the two posts serve as summer training sites for two of the ITAAS.

DESERT SHIELD Training Update

Three National Guard Round-out brigades from Georgia, Louisiana and Mississippi have been mobilized and are scheduled to deploy in support of DESERT SHIELD. To ensure combat-ready S2 staffs, FORSCOM has mobilized ITAAS elements to qualify Guard soldiers in MI slots. At Fort Bragg, 2d ITAAS is conducting 96B training for some 25 soldiers. At Fort Huachuca, 6th ITAAS, in a solid team effort with the Intelligence Center, is providing DESERT SHIELD certification for some 30 Guard officers — a concrete example of MI Active and Reserve soldiers working together to develop and teach Guard soldiers. Kudos to all involved in this superb MI Total Force effort!

MI Force Structure

Many changes are taking place in this arena. As the threat alters from high to mid- and low-intensity conflicts, doctrine and structure of the Army change. This is especially true for intelligence, which becomes more important than ever. Currently, the RC comprises about 35 percent of the MI Total Force structure. We expect this percentage to increase as more COMPO 2 (National Guard) structures come on line. Areas of growth include MI linguist battalions and MI unit support for separate brigades and armored cavalry regiments.

CAPSTONE Update

USAIC&FH is very pleased to announce a new CAPSTONE relation with the 300th MI Brigade (Linguist), headquartered at Draper, Utah. The MI Proponent describes the 300th as "a national treasure." Soldiers from this unit are serving in Operation DESERT SHIELD and are doing a superb job. We look forward to a long and productive relationship.

As a specific example of this partnership, the MI Proponent is working with the 300th to establish a linguist MOS. This new MOS will only apply to the RC. It will allow RC linguist units to recruit native speakers who can be MOS qualified without security requirements and long MI school training. This linguist track will also be used as a feeder MOS for MI language-required MOS such as 97B, 97E and 98G. This is an innovative example of the wise use of civilian skills for military requirements.

ITAAS SUMMER 91 OPERATIONS

It's not too soon to plan your summer 91 training. Please be aware that all ITAAS courses are on the Army Training Requirements and Resource System (ATRRS) for individual training. Simply stated, the best place to find out what courses are offered at each ITAAS is to use ATRRS. Schedules and start times are fully listed. If you have any questions contact your personnel manager at ARPERCEN or your State Training Office for access to ATRRS. If you're in a bind and can't get information, here are the five ITAAS phone numbers:

First Army ITAAS Fort Devens, MA. (617) 796-6091	Second Army ITAAS Fort Bragg, NC (919) 396-6837
Fourth Army ITAAS Fort McCoy, WI (608) 388-4100	Fifth Army ITAAS Fort Sam Houston, TX (512) 221-7738
Sixth Army ITAAS Los Alamitos, CA (213) 493-2805	

COMPO 2 and the Proponent

The MI proponent is very pleased to welcome the FIRST addition from the National Guard. Sergeant Major Bill Coyle, fresh from Korea, has joined the MI RC team. With more than 50 percent of the RC students here at the Intelligence Center coming from Guard units, Coyle will be a focal point for action and service to Guard soldiers. Any Guard soldiers with questions can reach him at AUTOVON 821-3982/3984 or commercial (602) 533-3982.

Colonel Joseph T. Mesch is the Reserve Forces Advisor to the Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. His previous AGR assignments include HQDA, the Pentagon; First U.S. Army, Fort Meade, Md.; and ARPERCEN, St. Louis, Mo.

TRAINING NOTES

PEDAGOGY vs. ANDRAGOGY: Are We Treating Our Students Like Children?


by Carolyn E. Saunders

Instructors at U.S. Army schools often observe a phenomenon that might be termed "typical student behavior syndrome." In the classroom, the most mature individuals seem to revert to something akin to childlike student behavior. As instructors, we tend to accept this phenomenon as just the way things are without considering the underlying cause. We never question IF this is the way it **HAS** to be. Perhaps we need to ask ourselves if our students act like children because we are treating them as children, rather than adults, in the classroom. Or to take this analysis one step further, perhaps we are using principles of learning more suitable to children than to adults.

Two models are used in educational research to describe how people learn — the pedagogical model and the andragogical model. "Pedagogy," or the art or profession of teaching, evolved from the Greek words for "leader of children." The pedagogical model describes the traditional learning situation with which we are all familiar — the learner completely depends on the teacher for learning to occur. The learner doesn't play an active part, doesn't take part in the learning activities, and the activities themselves are subject-centered. That is, learning is considered a process of acquiring information, and the information to be acquired has been determined by the teacher based on his perception of what the

learner needs. The learner must be motivated to learn by outside pressure from others (i.e. parents, teachers).

As "adult education" became a recognized field in the 1920's and 1930's, researchers became interested in identifying and exploiting the unique characteristics of adult learners. What has become known as the definitive theory of



adult learning was synthesized by Malcolm Knowles in 1970. He based his theory on his own work in the adult education field and the concepts of numerous educators and researchers. He began using the term "andragogy" which had been coined in Europe as the parallel to pedagogy. It was applied to "...the growing body of knowledge and technology in regard to adult learning...being defined as the art and science of helping adults learn."¹

Under this model of learning, the learner is responsible for his own learning or is "self-directing." The experience of the learner (and that of others within a particular learning group) is considered a rich resource for learning. The learner is ready to learn when he recognizes a need to know or to do something that he does not know or cannot do. And the learner is motivated to learn internally.

Adults are self-directing — that is, they are responsible for directing their own lives. When they are put in a formal learning situation — a class, a course, a school — they have been conditioned by all their previous school experience to revert to that dependent role and wait for someone to teach them. But at the same time, their need to be self-directing comes into conflict with this dependency, and as a result they rebel against the situation. This rebellion may manifest itself in numerous ways — boredom, inattention, outright rudeness or hostile behavior. However, this does not have to be the way it is; instructors are not doomed to an "us against them" existence. By applying the andragogical approach to learning, we can help our students make the transition from dependency to self-directed learners.

Of course, the question now arises, "But how can I do that?" Malcolm Knowles' book, **Andragogy in Action**, is an excellent guide to implementing the andragogical model. This book includes 36 case studies of successful application of the model in training situations in business; industry; government; educational settings such as colleges, universities and secondary schools; in soft-skill areas such as management training; and in high technology and professional areas such as computer science, accounting and law.

In one case study, describing work he did with a national accounting firm, training consultant Fredic Margolis found that comments such as "This training program doesn't reflect the real world," and "Too many lectures and slides. After a while, it all seemed the same," indicate that the

process of merely conveying information is not as effective for training as it needs to be. He developed the following checklist to determine whether a program is information based (pedagogical model) or andragogical.

1. Are participants given problems or situations to analyze or solve, followed by the information needed to analyze or solve the problems?

2. Are participants given presentations, films or readings, followed by a series of problems or cases to which they apply the information?

3. Are problems or cases designed primarily to help participants do their work more effectively?

4. Are problems or cases designed primarily to help participants understand the concepts?

5. Is 50 percent or more of the training time used by participants to actively engage in problem solving, analysis or decision making — usually with the help of other students?

6. Is the primary job of the instructor to present information, discuss questions or pose reinforcing questions to the class?

7. Is the primary job of the instructor to help, consult, advise and pose problems to be analyzed (both individually and in small groups) and then manage an interactive discussion?²

Yes answers to the even numbered questions indicate a program is pedagogical, while yes answers to the odd numbered questions indicate an andragogical approach. If your analysis indicates a pedagogical approach and you want to change this, Margolis also came up with a standard format that he says interjects the andragogical approach into even highly technical topics.

1. A brief introduction and explanation.

2. Detailed specific instructions for the participants to follow.

3. The participants' active engagement in these activities — whether small-group discussion, question-and-answer sessions, or whatever.

4. A sharing or synthesis by the participants.

5. A summary or presentation by the instructor, based not on prepared texts but on some of the comments produced in the activity. This can also incorporate examples, presentation of principles or practical experiences.³

The advantages Margolis observed, as a result of implementing an andragogical model in his training programs, highlight the fact that adults need a different approach to training. For example, the courses using the andragogical approach were seen as directly related to the participants'

work which resulted in increased motivation and attention to learning.⁴

If you have been involved, either as a student or as an instructor, with Small Group Instruction (SGI) in recent years, you may recognize aspects of the andragogical model in SGI. In attempting to implement SGI at the Intelligence School, all we've really been trying to do is implement principles of learning that are more applicable for adults. Having students totally dependent on an instructor to make learning occur may be appropriate in some cases with adults (for example, if they are faced with a completely new piece of equipment), but it is obviously more appropriate for very young children. In most cases, andragogical assumptions seem more appropriate for adults, and as Knowles points out, "There is growing evidence that andragogical assumptions are realistic in many more situations than traditional schooling has recognized (even for children)."⁵

As Army trainers, we no longer have to rely on a "feeling" that there must be a better way to provide training. We can implement an andragogical approach that is backed up by solid research that found that self-directed learning is the natural mode for adults, that adult students do possess the characteristics assumed in the andragogical model, and that learning does increase when this model is used. In addition, a number of studies of the model are still in progress.⁶

With the future trend of Army training mov-

ing towards distributed training and with constant changes in technology dictating the need for soldiers to be self-directed learners, the andragogical model seems to meet our needs. So let's move in that direction with training that:

- Emphasizes the skills of analysis and decision making through a series of job-related cases or problems.

- Establishes a learning approach rather than a teaching approach by a series of planned structured activities enabling the learner to acquire the appropriate knowledge.

- Is a practical, job-based approach which keeps the learners constantly aware of the value of the training program to them and their work.⁷ In other words, let's move from pedagogy into andragogy.

Endnotes

1. Malcolm Knowles, **Andragogy in Action** (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, Calif., 1984), p. 6.
2. Ibid., p. 47.
3. Ibid., pp. 49-50.
4. Ibid., p. 53.
5. Ibid., p. 13.
6. Ibid., p. 421.
7. Ibid., p. 48.

Carolyn E. Saunders is an instructor in the Staff and Faculty Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School. This is her third training article for MI Professional Bulletin.

LESSONS LEARNED OFFICE

The Intelligence Center Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization (DOES) at Fort Huachuca has established a Lessons Learned Office (LLO) to track specific Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) issues and lessons learned. The LLO identifies and disseminates IEW lessons learned which impact on Doctrine, Training, Organization, Materiel, and Leadership (DTOML) issues.

The Lessons Learned Office needs your comments regarding DTOML issues and lessons learned. Sources for lessons learned include training observations, trip reports, deployments, and conferences. Of particular interest are Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) and lessons learned from unit S2s, MI battalions, Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations, and

deployments such as Operation DESERT SHIELD. The LLO will incorporate your DTOML issues and lessons learned with those generated by the Intelligence Center, CTC, and the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL).

Appropriate DTOML issues and lessons learned will be disseminated through existing publications such as the **Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin** and **Intelligence Doctrine and Training Notes**, and incorporated into future revisions of doctrinal publications.

The DOES Lessons Learned POC is MAJ L.H. Lemelson III, AUTOVON 821-1743, Commercial (602) 533-1743. Send your issues and lessons learned to the following address.

Commander
U.S. Army Intelligence Center
ATTN: ATSI-ESL
Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7000

VANTAGE POINT *(continued from page 2)*

Training System (GIITS) to train our officer and imagery analysts at Fort Huachuca how to exploit new digital imagery systems. We continue to develop our top priority IEW Tactical Proficiency Trainer (IEWTPT) with Electronic Proving Ground assistance. We hope to have a prototype of one module of the IEWTPT, the voice intercept trainer with Arabic Iraqi voice scenarios, ready to deploy to units in DESERT SHIELD by January 1991.

We published four Mission Training Plans (MTPs) for MI units and began production of a Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) manual on TCAE Operations during the past year. We also developed an MI Combat Assessment Table (CAT) which provides a scoreable equivalent of Tank Gunnery Table VIII for MI systems and units.

Finally, we assumed executive agency responsibility from DoD for training all services in the operation and maintenance of the Pioneer UAV system. This responsibility will extend to the UAV-Short Range system, the production Corps UAV, when it is fielded. We established a Pioneer UAV platoon, which is the Army's only fully operational UAV capability. The platoon recently deployed to support DESERT SHIELD. We are forming a second UAV platoon which will support the flyoff between two contractor systems competing for the UAV-Short Range contract. The two competing systems will be delivered to us in March 1991 and the flyoff will begin in approximately July 1991.

We continue to play effectively in the area of materiel development. All of our flagship systems rank highly in the TRADOC 1-N prioritization of all systems which feed the POM build. As a consequence, all of our flagship systems continue to be funded for fielding in the POM years. These include the Imagery Processing and Dissemination System, the Tactical High Mobility Terminal, GUARDRAIL Common Sensor, UAV-Short Range, UAV-Close Range (the Division UAV), Joint STARS, Ground-based Common Sensor, Advanced QUICKFIX, TRACKWOLF, and ASAS. These are vast improvements over present systems and they will revolutionize the way we do our business. They also will revolutionize the way the Army fights. To that end we have worked for the past year with the Commander,

TRADOC and the commandants of the other TRADOC schools to rewrite AirLand Battle-Future to take advantage of the extraordinary capabilities of our new intelligence systems.

We are also revamping other aspects of our doctrine to meet future needs. Key publications developed this year include:

FM 34-36, Special Operations Forces IEW Operations, will establish TTP for planning and conducting IEW operations in support of SOF. This manual extracts principles from FM 100-25, the capstone manual for SOF operations, and translates them into "how to" procedures. Of significance is the emphasis on IPB in support of the ALB-F non-linear battlefield. This manual goes to the field in the 3d quarter of FY 91.

We are also in the final production of FM 34-2-1, **Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support for Counterreconnaissance**. This manual was written to correct a continuing major deficiency noted at all CTCs.

We're just starting production of FM 34-7 **IEW Support in LIC Operations**. This groundbreaking manual will provide the Army with IPB tactics, techniques and procedures needed to support commanders in all four operational categories of LIC. As an interim measure, we have produced a white paper on IPB in LIC.

We have also developed new Electronic Warfare and weather concepts, a new IEW communications architecture, and are devising a workable concept for Counter-SIGINT. The latter will be done by March 1991.

To ensure we support Army Commanders and capitalize on latest technological advances, we continue to evolve the Army Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Master Plan or AIMP as the single vector to the future for MI. The AIMP is the basic feeder document for our IEW Modernization Plan which constrains the AIMP to fiscal reality and provides our going in position to the POM build.

We are also eliciting outside support to pursue technologies that can leverage our capabilities. We have three no-cost contracts with industry and are negotiating two more which allow major firms to focus significant independent R&D resources on specific MI requirements. We maintain our Artificial Intelligence Lab and, with Harry Diamond Labs, have built an Artificial Intelligence Module Test Bed—now called Hawk-eye—using more than \$15 million of OSD Balanced Technology Initiative money. This system has been deployed to V and VII Corps and will

deploy with the latter to DESERT SHIELD. Hawkeye is designed to demonstrate how artificial intelligence can enhance ASAS in its planned product improvements program. It also may be incorporated into development of the ASAS collateral enclave.

We recently established MOUs with NSA and DARPA to leverage their R&D efforts to address mutual collection and processing problems. We are also collaborating with NSA on simulations to complement our IEW Functional Area Model (FAM) and provide the best possible analytical underpinnings to justify our system requirements and capture their battlefield contributions.

In the force structure arena we have worked proactively with the DCSINT, DA and INSCOM to shape our MI force as the Army reduces in size through processes like QUICKSILVER, VANGUARD, AUDIT, etc. MI 2000 was written with the DCSINT, DA to articulate how we must be structured in the future to satisfy commanders at all echelons, while reducing the MI force by about 7200 active military and civilian authorizations by 1997. These reductions are about 25 percent of the active MI force and could have been greater had we not made a clear case for MI and articulated a clear vision of our future structure. Clearly, the Army leadership recognizes that as the Army gets smaller we need better intelligence. That is why our systems have fared so well in the POM and why we haven't suffered greater personnel cuts.

We are now working to capture MI 2000 in the AIMP and to refine MI organizations from battalion through EAC to ensure we can support commanders in peace and war. INSCOM is actively supporting our efforts to ensure we have a coherent and totally complementary structure between ECB and EAC.

In the proponent area, we've made important strides in addressing endemic shortages of CPTs, MAJs, and LTCs. We've participated actively in AUDIT and VANGUARD force reduction actions to prevent anyone from breaking the branch or a particular MOS, and to shape our officer authorizations to fix longstanding shortages and maldistribution problems. Once we had a feel for where those actions were taking us, we developed an action plan to correct remaining problems in our officer inventory and its distribution. This action plan was briefed to the DCSINT and DCSPER in November 1990, and both supported it. The DCSPER personally approved virtually all aspects of the action plan for implementation,

although he will study some of our proposals further, as they impact other branches. The DCSPER approved establishment of MI "must fill" positions at all echelons, in all MACOMs and joint agencies, and a management plan to ensure they are filled to 100 percent.

With this authority we've begun to work with MACOMs and joint agencies to identify positions that absolutely must be filled by MI officers of the proper rank, e.g., maneuver battalion and brigade S2 positions. Through this process we will refine the MI Officer Structuring Study and, in essence, reorient the ODP for MI officers for both MACOMs and Joint Accounts to individual jobs in specific units and not just gross numbers per command or agency. Topping it off will be a management plan to ensure designated jobs are, in fact, filled properly. Positions authorizing MI officers, but not designated "must fill," will be filled to the extent possible, although there may be some grade substitution. The intent of this entire effort is to ensure we, as a branch, support the Army properly. We anticipate a definite improvement in our support to the tactical force at ECB at the expense of some non-JDAL joint positions and some Army EAC requirements.

Other proponent actions in 1990 include implementing the Civilian Intelligence Personnel Management System (CIPMS); identifying new MOSs for UAV operators and JSTARS Ground Station Module operators; initiating action to establish a new MOS for linguists in the Reserve Components which would be a feeder for MOS 97B, 98G, and 97E. This new linguist MOS would allow RC units to report individuals with language skills as MOS qualified without having to wait long periods until they complete intelligence MOS training.

In addition to the actions described here, we have also assumed major additional responsibilities of installation command at Fort Huachuca, which brings a whole new set of challenges. For example, we have totally merged our staffs and budgets and picked up major mobilization responsibilities supporting DESERT SHIELD (over 2000 troops and 16 million pounds of equipment deployed thus far without missing a beat).

Despite all we have accomplished, we still have major challenges facing our branch. I will address those in the next issue of the bulletin. I know this has been a long article, but I wanted you to know that your Center is acting now to ensure that we remain "Always Out Front."

PROFESSIONAL READING

Comparing Foreign Intelligence: The U.S., The U.S.S.R., The U.K., and the Third World ed. by Roy Godson, New York: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1988, 157 pages.

Comparing Foreign Intelligence is a good book overall. If the study of foreign intelligence interests you, this book does a good job of explaining the different methods used and problems encountered. The title, however, is misleading. A more appropriate title would be **Comparing the Study of Foreign Intelligence**, for this is what the book is about. Edited by Roy Godson, the book contains six essays on the study of intelligence. By looking at the major works on the issue of intelligence, Godson classifies four main approaches: professional, liberal, historical and realist.

The second essay, "Historical Research on the British Intelligence Community" by Christopher Andrew, discusses the problems of researching British intelligence activities. This problem arises due to the lack of open information and the government's paranoia with declassifying anything that was once of value.

John J. Dziak's "The Study of the Soviet Intelligence and Security System" is the best essay in the book. Dziak goes beyond the problems found in the study of Soviet intelligence and clearly writes how the Soviet Union became a counter-

intelligence state and how it differs from countries in the West. The essay ends with a selected bibliography on works concerning Soviet intelligence.

Dale F. Eichelman deals with intelligence in Oman. Eichelman, an anthropologist, chose Oman as being representative of Arab Gulf States. This chapter discusses both the history and peculiarities of intelligence in Oman during the period 1957 and 1970. The author also presents how he researched his topic and the methods he used.

Adda Bozeman wrote the book's final essay. It deals with the study of political intelligence in non-Western countries. Bozeman develops a basis for comparing and understanding Western with non-Western countries. Case studies of China and Africa show early tries at understanding other cultures. She also examines problems with U.S. perceptions and the complications with understanding non-Western countries. This chapter is well written, but the author at times falls into the trap of the generalizations that she warns about.

**Second Lieutenant
Drew A. Swank
Augsburg, Germany**

Germany's Past and Europe's Future: The Challenges of West German Foreign Policy by Edwina S. Campbell, New York: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1989,

206 pages, bibliography and index.

Anyone seriously interested in the developments in Europe during the 1990's should read this book. Edwina S. Campbell's scholarly, perceptive analysis provides a sound basis for understanding events in Europe today. She includes footnotes with additional explanation of many of the items she discusses, and the bibliography is excellent. This is a very solid work that I strongly recommend.

*"One of
Germany's
primary goals all
along, of course,
has been to
reunite the two
portions of the
country."*

Although the book was published several months before the dramatic changes in Europe last summer, its conclusions are still as valuable as they were when Campbell wrote it. The book's success lies in Campbell's interpretation of the actions of the West German government since World War II. She analyzes German foreign policy and determines a course of action that all of the German leaders since the war have followed. This course of

action has lead toward a reestablishment of Germany as the major power in Central Europe.

The German government at the end of World War II had some very serious decisions to make. The country was in shambles politically, economically, morally and, in a sense, historically. Americans often think of the Marshall Plan as the salvation of Europe, but Germany's problems were much more than just economic. The country was divided between four major powers and faced the soul-searching moral and historical consequences of the social and cultural legacy of the National Socialist party.

Campbell quite briefly summarizes these problems and then proceeds with her analysis of Germany's actions. The most pressing problems were political and historical. Germany had to reestablish itself as a political entity and restore her worth in the light of two recent world wars. The foreign power that was potentially most valuable to Germany at the time was France. The French had to be convinced that Germany had learned something from its losing experiences and would not rush into another war to restore its national honor. Fortunately, there were influential Frenchmen who also recognized that Germany had a significant role to play in a new Europe. The French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, and a leading economist, Jean Monnet, proposed the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950. This pioneering organization required the cooperation of all nations in Europe with coal and steel interests. The ECSC laid the foundation for what

was to be a very successful period of Franco-German cooperation.

After nearly 25 years of work establishing relations with France and the West, Germany turned its attention to the East. The first targets for German foreign relations were East Germany and the Soviet Union. Although progress was much slower, the result was still successful. By the early 1980's, West Germany had succeeded in establishing more or less friendly relationships with the East as well as the West. This turn toward the East caused some concern among Germany's Western friends, but not enough to cause any serious change in relationships. In effect, Germany seems to be moving more toward a neutral position, having strong ties with both East and West, thereby working toward the goal of establishing itself as the major power in central Europe.

One of Germany's primary goals all along, of course, has been to reunite the two portions of the country. By establishing cooperation with both Western allies and Eastern neighbors, Germany has laid a solid foundation for reunification.

As this book went to press, Campbell concluded with words which seem prophetic today, "...the German question is open as long as the Brandenburg Gate is closed. When the day comes Unter den Linden is once again an East-West axis, Bonn's policies of detente, in the West and the East, will have succeeded" (page 202, emphasis added).

Captain Robert McMichael
Fort Huachuca, Arizona

The World Atlas of Warfare: Military Innovations

that Changed the Course of History by Richard Holmes (general editor and main contributor), New York: Viking Studio Books, 1988, 293 pages with bibliography and index, \$40.00.

This book can, and should be read by anyone with an interest in military history or technology, whatever their background. Richard Holmes has lead his team of British historians to produce a first-class book on military innovations. Covering a period from 2500 B.C. until 1987 A.D., Holmes' team has highlighted an amazing number of technological and tactical changes which have enabled innovators to win battles and wars. The authors employ an unusual talent for explaining political situations, technologies, and tactics and strategy in a very clear and concise style. The plentiful supply and wide variety of the illustrations add dramatically to the text.

Captain Robert McMichael
Fort Huachuca, Arizona

Surprise Attack, The Victim's Perspective by Ephraim Kam, London: Harvard Univ. Press, 1988.

This is one of the few books I have read with pencil in hand to underline and heighten the important lesson points from a man who combines practical experience in analysis with historical and statistical evidence. I highly recommend the book to all intelligence professionals but most especially to those who work in the indications and warnings field.

Ephraim Kam is a former intelligence analyst for the Israeli Ministry of Defense and

is now senior lecturer at the Israeli National Defense College. He brings a wealth of knowledge and experience to the subject, knowledge that includes the most modern methods of collecting and analyzing data. Kam is a trained political scientist who sees not only how intelligence is collected and analyzed but how decision makers choose to use or not to use the information in plans, policies and decisions. This becomes the cornerstone of his presentation.

Kam examines surprise attacks since 1939, keying on incidents that are well known to the military audience. However, the value of this book may be in the author's exact examination of the role of strategic intelligence, an examination that is so thorough and interesting it could be used as a textbook for strategic collection and analysis. The book is divided into three parts — the first dealing with components of surprise attack; the second, judgmental biases and intelligence analysis; and the third, the "environment" of intelligence analysis. It is in this third part, that Kam brings his recommen-

"No one in Washington realized Tojo's regime regarded the conquest of Asia NOT as the achievement of an ambition, but as survival of the regime."

dations for an improvement in the relationship of the analyst, his product and the decision maker who will use the product.

The military intelligence reader finds much to agree with in Kam's presentation. His statistics point out that since 1939, no nation has been caught completely by surprise by attacks. He says, in fact, that the victims usually had an abundance of information, but the timeliness and the focus of the analysis did not "mesh" with policy/decisions and caused a nation to look one way when the attack came from somewhere else. He reexamines the interdependence of intentions and capabilities and does a great job in pointing out that an analyst's first duty is to see the enemy's activities from the enemy point of view, not to assume that the enemy will act in a rational manner, and, above all, realize that the enemy's expectations will not be his expectations. Here he illustrates his point with a wonderful quote from former Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, who commented on the government's attitude toward Japan before Pearl Harbor:

"No one in Washington realized Tojo's regime regarded the conquest of Asia NOT as the achievement of an ambition, but as survival of the regime. It was Life and Death to them. He had told the Imperial Privy Council that if Japan submitted to American demands, they would not only lose prestige...but Japan's existence itself would be in jeopardy!"

Kam points out that analysts must also constantly reexamine axioms about the enemy. Using Pearl Harbor again, he cites the fact that Japan's naval and air capabilities were never re-an-

alyzed in the years prior to the attack. A re-analysis might have taken the mask off Japan's abilities to "power project" at great distances. His point is well taken when he says that in the overall scheme, the analyst is trying to determine the oppositions' strategic decision...decisions that are the most closely guarded of national secrets and doubly hard to ascertain from regimes noted for strict security (the World War II Germans and Russians to be exact).

Kam wisely guides the reader to a view that even with the most modern methods of collecting data, the human analyst must still make a decision based on a number of factors. Citing Ronald Lewin's "ULTRA syndrome," Kam quotes him as saying, "...because the intercepts are so authentic, so eloquent...they must tell everything," and this fallacy is seen again and again in the more modern instances of surprise attack. He urges analysts to satisfy what testimony before the 1975 Church commission stated as "the increasing requirement of intelligence consumers to receive a product that spells out distinctions between different interpretations with judgments as to relative probabilities."

The book closes with Kam's views about receipt and use of the intelligence product by the decision makers. Here he draws on his own experience and the historical record of past cases. He brings the message of the book to the point of stating that the decision maker bears the responsibility to accept or reject analysis and also, more importantly, to put the effective countermeasures into play. Where there is a breakdown here,

there is a breakdown of the system, and the nation involved increases its odds of being surprised.

His recommendations for improvement include not only improved collection and warning systems but also a change in the relationship between a nation's intelligence community and its decision makers.

Captain Rick Ugino
Rochester, N.Y.

Red Thrust: Attack on the Central Front, Soviet Tactics and Capabilities in the 1990s by Steven J. Zaloga, Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1989, 258 pages, \$18.95.

Of all the "World War III" novels published in the last five years, **Red Thrust** is the closest to a doctrinal description of Soviet combined arms operations. Unlike **Red Storm Rising**, "Team Yankee" and **Sword Point** which rely on an elaborate build up to hostilities, **Red Thrust** uses current international political events to realistically construct a future European conflict.

Regardless of how one feels about the scenario, the most valuable part of the book is the discussion and review of Soviet doctrine at the end of each chapter. This, combined with the numerous terminology and equipment footnotes throughout the book, makes this reference an exceptional one to add to a professional military library.

Though Steven J. Zaloga composed **Red Thrust** a year before the dramatic November 1989 events in Berlin, his book forecasts a scenario in which thousands of East German citizens flee to the West through

the Berlin wall. As a result of the apparent dissolution of the German Democratic Republic, Soviet authorities attempt to take control, only to find their own soldiers being disarmed and fired on by East German soldiers.

Seeing that their Warsaw Pact allies are adopting a "wait and see" attitude, the Soviets realize that the only way they can prevent a domino effect is to move swiftly and dominate both Germanys.

The action takes place in Czechoslovakia and Bavaria. Each of the seven chapters reviews the overlapping activities of motorized rifle troops, tanks, Spetsnaz, attack helicopters, artillery, air force operations and chemical warfare during the first few days' battle. As one chapter ends, the next continues with a different combat arm's activities during the same or related operations.

In terms of AirLand Battle tenets, the *agility* of the Soviet forces is limited by their strict command and control. Flexibility is lost as the Soviet motorized rifle divisions begin to meet stiff resistance and their own resources are thinly spread across the front. Within a few days of the invasion, the Soviet commanders realize that priority for artillery, air and air mobile support has gone to the northern forces.

In the beginning of the fight, *initiative* goes to the attackers as the MRDs have no trouble crossing the border into West Germany. Soviet forces move into West Germany but begin to experience delays within the first 20 kilometers of the frontier. Soviet commanders find that they are now behind schedule and have taken more serious losses than expected. The

initiative is lost completely as the Soviets cross the Danube. Bridging equipment is slow to move forward, river currents drag amphibious armored vehicles downstream, and an airmobile operation on the west bank fails because it cannot be reinforced in time by mechanized units.

The *depth* of the battle is limited by the Soviet ability to support maneuver forces by artillery and air support. In Zaloga's story, NATO quickly achieves air supremacy and harasses Soviet air fields throughout Czechoslovakia. Without air and artillery support, the small battles take their toll of Soviet maneuver forces and force the first echelon into a hasty defense.

At the outset of the war, the Soviet war machine was able to maintain *synchronization* with its combat arms. The first few chapters of the book are linked to one another by the mutual support given by combined arms elements. The second half of the book, however, shows the rapid breakdown of the Soviet attack as the air force is attrited, artillery is dispersed or stranded on the east bank of the Danube, and small unit commanders become more cautious.

Far from ending as a NATO or Soviet victory, the story concludes with Soviet and West German forces using chemical weapons. Unfortunately there is no information as to the outcome of the conflict. Zaloga, whose goal is describing Soviet operations by fictional example, ends the narrative.

Red Thrust is clearly a docu-drama of how the next war may have been fought based on the emerging technologies of the 1990's. Some

students of Soviet doctrine might be annoyed by the beating the Soviets take. When criticizing the story, it must be remembered that the story takes place as seen through Soviet eyes, and so we have no real appreciation for damage done to Western forces.

Captain Kevin R. Austra
1st Armored Division

Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies by David H. Flaherty, Chapel Hill, N.C.: The Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1989, 483 pages.

Overall, **Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies** is articulate, well thought-out and nicely presented. David Flaherty is not overly academic in his writing style, however the book does edge towards the "dry" rating on the readability scale. I would not recommend it for the casual reader, but it would definitely be an asset for those engaged in policy development, and it certainly has a place in research libraries.

Flaherty presents the reader with what appears to be the first cross-national analysis of the issue of data protection. Unlike other books on data privacy, **Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies** criticizes the approaches various nations have taken to address the threat information technology poses to personal privacy.

In this current analysis, Flaherty examines the laws of five Western democracies: The Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, France, Canada and the United States. **Protecting Privacy** will therefore be of immense interest to readers involved in policy development

or policy review. Although ostensibly a critical analysis, Flaherty's conclusions are clearly prescriptive. He presents the reader with the case for privacy legislation, the need for governments to define the scope of their privacy laws, and the logical follow-on to this step — the necessity for data protection agencies. He then goes on to discuss the need for independence for data protection agencies and expresses some thoughts on their exercise of powers, auditing their operations, and the public's right to access data.

Finally, having investigated at some depth the seriousness of privacy in "surveillance societies," Flaherty doesn't leave the reader with the feeling of melancholy but closes with a positive prognosis for the future. Professing to be an "optimist," Flaherty says he is "...an overall admirer of the [data protection authority's] track record to date." He considers that the current model of having independent agencies overseeing the issue of privacy with regard to data collection, storage, etc., is truly serving the public's best interests. He believes that the continuation of such a system will bode well for the future.

Mr. Henry W. Printkin

Right -v- Might: International Law and the Use of Force by Louis Henkin, Stanley Hoffmann, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick and Allan Gerson, William D. Rogers, David J. Scheffer; N.Y.: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1989, 124 pages, \$12.95.

Right -v- Might is a readable book with some thoughtful ideas for policy makers. It is a book military intelligence practitioners should therefore consider seriously. It is definitely worth its modest price and would be a valuable resource for research libraries.

To military and political leaders, one of the most controversial issues of all times has got to be the question of whether force is a permissible option under international law for the promotion of democracy and human rights. **Right -v- Might** tackles this question head on. The authors, all internationally recognised experts in the field, present the reader

"To military and political leaders, one of the most controversial issues of all times has got to be the question of whether force is a permissible option under international law for the promotion of democracy and human rights."

with a significant contribution to this topic. It is a book worthy of reading, especially for those intelligence personnel interested in doctrine.

The publisher has presented

a superb volume containing essays on The Reagan Doctrine, Human Rights, and International Law; The Use of Force: Law and U.S. Foreign Policy; Ethics and Rules of the Game Between the Superpowers; and the Principles of Force, The Force of Principles. I rated all of the articles in the upper half on the "readability scale." Although not academically "dry" in style, the contributions to this volume are nonetheless all scholarly in approach. This is a refreshing plus for readers. **Right -v- Might** is a thought provoking treatment but refrains from indulging in the self-serving intellectualisms so often found in many theoretical appraisals.

This book pulls no punches. It delivers views on American foreign policy from opposing view points. For instance, Kirkpatrick and Gerson open the series with their interpretation of the Reagan Doctrine and contrast it against America's intervention in Grenada, through to the U.S. bombing of Libya. Rogers, on the other hand, points out the complexity of using force in international affairs and, quite articulately, points out the shortcomings of international law.

Henry W. Prunckun, Jr.
Adelaide, South Australia

Orders of Magnitude. A History of the NACA and NASA, 1915-1990 by Roger E. Bilstein, Washington, D.C.: Scientific and Technical Information Division, 1989, 167 pages, \$6.00.

This concise historical guide explains the significant contributions that the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-

tion and its forerunner the National Committee for Aeronautics have made to U.S. aeronautics and space flight. This well-written book has many illustrations and will appeal to those readers who have an interest in space flight and aeronautical developments. The book allows the reader to easily grasp the wealth of technical innovations which both agencies have produced.

Orders of Magnitude starts with an examination of early wind tunnels at Langley, Va. and the effect these and other engineering tools had on aircraft in the 1920's and 1930's. Dr. Goddard's early rocketry experiments are also discussed. These first years included both civil and military research projects and the expansion of the agency's physical facilities. Since most of the aircraft manufacturers had moved their plants to the West coast, a wind tunnel research complex was built at Moffett Field to support such developments as the McDonnell Douglas DC-3. During World War II, the NACA solved many problems the military experienced with Army Air Force and Navy aircraft. High speed diving problems in the P-38 were some of the problems tackled.

Bilstein feels the criticism leveled at the agency after the war about the lack of supersonic research is unjustified in view of the demands placed on the agency by the war and the lack of funding by Congress. The NACA had helped to develop the first American jet-powered aircraft, the XP-59A. As information on advanced aerodynamics and rocketry began to trickle out of defeated Germany, NACA engineers began to explore designs for aircraft

that could break the sonic barrier. The X-1 was produced for the U.S. Air Force with considerable help from the NACA.

On October 1, 1958, NACA was redesignated as NASA and given control of its own budget. Before spaceflight, NASA developed the X-15 to test the hypersonic envelope. These missions allowed NASA to gather some of the data required for the Space Shuttle. The X-15 required new engineering practices to be used and exotic metals such as titanium to be developed. Between 1959 and 1968 a trio of X-15s completed 199 test flights, most of which left the earth's upper atmosphere.

But the program that NASA is most closely associated with is the U.S. manned space flight program. From Mercury through Gemini to Apollo, NASA achieved the dream of America and put a man on the moon. The entire "race to the moon" is described including some of the pitfalls the agency suffered along the way.

Interspersed between space research and the Apollo flights were other important experiments and developments that proved the United States was at the forefront of technology. Even today NASA is involved with other projects besides the Shuttle. The book concludes with a chapter about some of the future plans the agency has. With all the bad publicity NASA has received with its Space Shuttle and Hubble telescope, this book reminds the reader that there have always been both setbacks and great achievements in the history of NASA.

**Lieutenant
Gilles Van Nederveen**
Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C.



MILITARY QUALIFICATION STANDARDS SYSTEM

The Army's system to develop officers as leaders is called Military Qualification Standards (MQS). It provides officers, school commandants and commanders a framework for common and branch specific training, education and professional development. MQS I encompasses precommissioning training. MQS II covers company grade officer training. MQS III applies to field grade officers.

The MQS system identifies common and branch training requirements for officers. It has two components: a military task and knowledge component, and a professional military education component. The military task and knowledge component consists of both common and branch-specific critical tasks on which officers must train. The professional military education component focuses on improving cognitive skills through a reading program and, for selected officers, advanced civil schooling.

MQS and Leader Development

Leader development results from the progressive and sequential education, training and experience an officer receives throughout his career. It starts in the precommissioning phases of training and stops only when the officer completes his military service. The process depends on three pillars for its success -- institutional training, operational assignments and self-development. Each of the pillars works in concert with the others.

School commandants (and other proponents) are most directly involved with the institutional training pillar, which includes the Officer Basic Course, Officer Advanced Course and the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3). Unit commanders are most directly involved with the operational assignments pillar. MQS provides the link between institutional training and operational assignments by helping commanders construct unit training plans and design junior officer development programs to complement the

training of unit Mission Essential Task Lists (METL). The individual officer is most directly involved with the self-development pillar. It includes professional reading and self study. The individual officer is ultimately responsible for his or her leader development.

MQS II

MQS II applies to company grade officers of all components. The goal of MQS II is to prepare company grade officers to accomplish their wartime tasks and to provide the basis for promotion to major and attendance at Command and Staff College (CSC) level schooling. It provides the bridge for officers to progress through the first and second career milestones (now called passage points). Passage points requirements include completion of appropriate branch schools and developmental assignments, demonstrated proficiency on common and branch tasks, and completion of specified portions of the Foundation Reading Program. The first passage point occurs when officers enter the Advanced Course. The second occurs when officers complete their company grade careers and either enter resident CGSC or enroll in non-resident CGSC.

MQS Distribution

The manuals will be fielded through pinpoint distribution. Commanders should ensure their pinpoint accounts accurately reflect their lieutenant and captain authorizations by branch on DA Form 12-99. Once the manuals are fielded, follow-on distribution (to newly commissioned officers) will be made in OBC. All lieutenants and captains should ensure that they receive a current copy of both the common manual and their appropriate branch manual. Check with your unit now to verify that your copies of the MQS II manuals are on order. All manuals should be distributed by March 1991.

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